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Résumé 
 
Cette thèse étudie l’impact de la composition du conseil d’administration sur la performance 
financière d’une entreprise. Elle est composée de trois chapitres. 
 
Dans le premier chapitre, nous effectuons une revue de la littérature sur les conseils 
d’administration. Nous pointons l’évolution de la gouvernance des entreprises au cours des 
dernières décennies, et montrons en quoi l’efficacité des conseils d’administration est devenue un 
sujet majeur de ce champ de recherche et une préoccupation importante des actionnaires et des 
régulateurs. En particulier, après avoir présenté le cadre théorique de la gouvernance, nous 
présentons les résultats des articles académiques étudiant l’impact de la composition du conseil 
d’administration sur la performance de l’entreprise. 
Dans les deuxième et troisième chapitres, nous étudions l’impact de la présence de différents 
types d’administrateurs au sein du conseil. 
Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous proposons un modèle théorique pour tenter de comprendre et de 
déterminer l’impact de la représentation salariale au conseil d’administration sur la valeur 
actionnariale de l’entreprise et sur l’horizon de ses investissements. Nos résultats suggèrent que 
la représentation salariale peut s’envisager comme un choix, pour les actionnaires, entre liquidité 
et information. Nous montrons que lorsque des représentants des salariés siègent au conseil 
d’administration d’une entreprise, celle-ci a une plus grande probabilité d’investir dans des 
projets à long-terme qu’une entreprise sans représentation salariale. Nous montrons également 
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que les salariés ayant accès à une information interne précieuse, leur présence au conseil 
d’administration peut permettre d’augmenter la valeur actionnariale de l’entreprise. Ainsi, nous 
proposons un modèle de la représentation salariale cohérent avec certaines études empiriques. 
Dans le troisième chapitre, nous étudions empiriquement l’impact des connexions politiques sur 
le taux d’intérêt d’emprunts bancaires en utilisant un échantillon de prêts concernant des 
entreprises de plusieurs pays. Si ce sujet a déjà été largement traité, nous proposons une nouvelle 
définition de la connexion politique que nous subdivisons en deux catégories, selon l’exposition 
médiatique, forte ou faible, des politiciens. Les politiciens les plus en vue sont aussi ceux pour  
lesquels le risque d’être soupçonné de conflit d’intérêt ou de manquement à l’éthique est le plus 
important, et pour qui le coût d’un scandale est le plus élevé. Aussi discriminons-nous les 
connexions politiques selon qu’elles impliquent des politiciens très en vue ou des politiciens à un 
niveau inférieur. Cette division se fonde sur l’hypothèse que les politiciens les plus exposés sont, 
ayant le plus à perdre d’un scandale, disposent de la marge de manœuvre la plus réduite en tant 
que dirigeants d’entreprise et sont donc les moins à même d’impacter la performance de 
l’entreprise. Nos résultats confortent la pertinence d’une telle redéfinition de la connexion 
politique en fonction de la visibilité des politiciens concernés. Nous montrons en particulier que 
les entreprises politiquement connectées qui empruntent auprès de banques politiquement 
connectées le font à des taux significativement inférieurs à celles non connectées, et que cet effet 
est plus important lorsque la connexion de l’emprunteur passe par un politicien moins exposé. 
Nos résultats suggèrent que l’effet est encore plus fort si la banque est elle aussi connectée par 
l’intermédiaire d’un politicien moins exposé. Par ailleurs, nous montrons que les entreprises 
connectées politiquement empruntent significativement moins auprès de banques connectées par 
l’intermédiaire d’un politicien très exposé médiatiquement. Nos résultats suggèrent enfin que cet 
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effet est plus fort à l’approche d’élections, un moment il est particulièrement coûteux pour un 
politicien d’être soupçonné de manquement à la déontologie. 
 
Mots clés: Théorie de l’agence - Gouvernance d’entreprise - Conseil d’administration –
Codétermination - Valeur actionnariale - Connexion politique 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis studies the impact of the composition of the board of directors on the firm financial 
performance. It consists of three chapters. 
 
In the first chapter, we review the literature on boards of directors. We show the evolution of 
corporate governance over the past decades, and how the efficiency of boards of directors has 
became a key issue for shareholders and regulators. After describing the theoretical and historical 
framework, we present and discuss the academic papers studying the impact of board 
composition on the firm performance. 
In the second and third chapters, we examine the impact of the presence of different directors on 
the board. 
In the second chapter, we provide a theoretical model that aims at understanding and determining 
the impact of employee representation on the board of directors on the shareholder value of the 
firm and on its investment horizon. Our results suggest that with employee representation, 
shareholders face a tradeoff between liquidity and information. We show that a firm with 
employee representation is more likely to invest in long-term rather than in short-term projects 
and that, because employees have access to valuable inside information, their presence on the 
board may increase the shareholder value. Consistent with some empirical studies, we offer some 
theoretical support for employee representation on the board. 
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In the third chapter, we study the impact of political connections on the rate of interest of bank 
loans. We conduct a cross-country study of the impact of political connections on bank loans 
interest rates. While this topic has already been widely investigated, we offer a new definition of 
political connection.  We subcategorize political connections into two categories: politicians with 
a high media exposure, and lower level politicians. Politicians with business ties bear the risk of 
being suspected of ethics breaching or of having conflicting interests, which can be costly for 
their reputation. We discriminate the political connections of firms based on the idea that with 
greater exposure comes greater risk of suspicion, and thus smaller ability to impact the firm 
performance. We study the impact of political connection of the borrower as well as of the lender 
on interest rates. Our results give support to our definition, as we find significant differences 
depending on the level of visibility of the political connections of the borrower and of the lender. 
Our results show that politically connected firms which borrow from politically connected banks 
enjoy a significantly lower rate if they are connected with lower level politicians. Our results 
suggest that the rate is even lower if the bank also is connected with lower level politicians. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that politically connected firms tend to avoid borrowing money 
from banks that are connected with top politicians. Our results also suggest that this effect is 
stronger in pre-election periods, when the potential cost for politicians of being suspected of 
collusion is higher. 
 
Keywords: Agency Theory - Agency Theory - Board of Directors – Codetermination - 
Shareholder Value - Politically connected firms 
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General Introduction 
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1. What is wrong with corporate governance? 
 
Over the past decades, corporate governance has been a core issue in multiple scandals involving 
large companies. Large multinational companies typically have complex organizational structures 
and a number of bodies supposed to act as safeguards against managerial misconducts. Yet, this 
has failed to prevent top executives to misbehave, leading to the fall of the likes of Enron.  
 
Managerial mischief is far from harmless: 4,000 of Enron employees were laid-off as the firm 
went bankrupt following the unveiling of frauds and insider trading by top managers. 15,000 lost 
their saving plans. Shareholders losses amounted to over $7billions. The subsequent shockwave 
was a devastating one, which wrecked Arthur Andersen, the accounting company responsible for 
Enron’s auditing and which was then seen as one of the “Big Five” accounting firms. While only 
a small team from the accounting giant was convicted of obstruction of justice, no less than 
85,000 lost their jobs when Arthur Andersen in turn collapsed. 
  
Enron’s fall, amongst very similar cases, such as Worldcom, Vivendi, or Barings Bank raised 
many questions. How could Enron’s CEO, admired by all, lead a company worth over 
$60billions in assets to bankruptcy? Was he nothing but a crook
1
? And if so, how could he fool 
shareholders, stakeholders and directors alike? How could they not see it coming? And then, how 
was it possible that some directors of large corporations be found lacking some basic managing 
and finance skills, as were some members of the board of Barings Bank, only after the second 
oldest commercial bank went bankrupt? 
                                                          
1
 Facts strongly suggest so, but his conviction in Enron’s case was vacated, as he died prior to exhausting his 
appeals. 
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With these questions, interest in the academic research on the topic grew, and emulated an 
already dynamic field of research. In an effort to prevent such catastrophes to happen again, the 
2000’s also saw an increase in rules and regulations, with some countries putting strong, 
mandatory requirements in place – the United States of America passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
– and others enforcing a “comply or explain” informal rule, leaving a substantial part of the 
regulation to the activism of investors – mainly in Europe. 
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2. Thesis Organization 
 
The purpose of this three-essay thesis is to investigate a particular facet of corporate governance 
that plays a key role in the conduct of corporations: boards of directors. This thesis is organized 
as follows. 
 
In the first chapter, we draw a survey of the literature on corporate governance and board of 
directors. We first present the general corporate governance framework, and the cornerstone 
theories this thesis is built on. We then focus on boards of directors. We review the evolution of 
legal rules and of good practice codes over the past decades and show how it has led to an 
increase in the board independence. Afterwards, we examine the link between some of board 
characteristics and firm performance. In particular, we investigate the effects of size, 
independence and of the presence of different types of directors – such as outsiders, bankers, 
women, employees or politicians – on firm performance and on shareholder value. 
 
In the second chapter, we propose a theoretical model of boards of directors, featuring employee 
representation. We try to provide the developing field of research on codetermination with a 
theory to explain how the presence of employee representatives on the board of directors can 
impact the strategic decisions made by the board, as well as to determine the effect of such a 
representation on various stakeholders. 
 
In the third chapter, we conduct a cross-country study on the implications of political connections 
on bank loans. We propose a new, innovative definition of political connections so as to account 
 13  
 
for the fact that politicians with business ties bear the risk of being publicly suspected of ethics 
breaching – to say the least. Our results provide support to the necessity of distinguishing 
political connections depending on the level and media exposure of related politicians. 
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3. Contribution 
 
The different chapters of this thesis differently contribute to the academic research on corporate 
boards. 
 
Far be it from us to claim that our literature review could be deemed nearing the pedagogical or 
demonstrative power of the ones written by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), or by Adams et al. 
(2010). Nonetheless, we provide a review with a slightly different focus, emphasizing the link 
between the presence of a particular director – or a particular type of directors – and firm 
performance. We also propose a rarely, if ever, offered historical perspective of employee 
representation, which we believe underline the highly political nature of the reason for the very 
existence of employee representation. 
 
In the second chapter, we develop a simple model of corporate boards including employee 
representatives. We extract and discuss some stylized facts from it. This model gives an 
explanation as to why even a limited employee representation on the board of directors may lead 
a company to invest more in long-term projects. We also show that, although not necessarily, this 
might be done while increasing one or both of shareholder value and of managers wealth. 
Consistent with empirical findings by Fauver and Fuerst (2006), we provide a theoretical model 
with the intent to help understand how employee representation can increase firm value. Thus, 
our results give some credit to the idea that limited employee representation on corporate boards 
can be beneficial to shareholders as well as other stakeholders. 
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In the third chapter, we investigate the effect of political connections on bank loan. The large 
number of politicians forced to resigned, or who saw their polls drop, on the sole suspicion that 
they may be connected to misbehaving managers lead us to assume that there is a risk for 
politicians to be tied to a company, and that the larger the media exposure of a politician, the 
greater the risk of his ties making it to the news. Hence, in lieu of the traditional definition such 
as given by Faccio (2006), we propose a definition which accounts for the different levels of 
exposure a politician may enjoy – or suffer from. We find evidence showing the accuracy of 
making such a distinction, as our results show that companies that are tied to a lower level 
politician borrow at significantly lower rates from politically connected banks. The effect appears 
to be even stronger when the lender himself is connected to a second rank politician. We also 
show that connected companies borrow much less frequently from banks connected with a high 
profile politician, in particular in the months before an election. We interpret this as the sign that 
politically connected companies take into account the risk borne by politicians they are linked 
with, and try to minimize it by refraining from dealing with banks tied to top politicians. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review on 
Corporate Governance and Board 
Composition 
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1.1. Introduction 
 
Following various corporate scandals over the last three decades – Enron and Worldcom being 
two of the most famous cases amongst dozens of others - and the 2008 financial crisis, light was 
shed on corporate governance issues, and in particular on the role of boards of directors.  
The bankruptcy of Worldcom in 2002 is an emblematic case of supervision failure. Following the 
revelation of years of accounting fraud led by the CEO of Worldcom himself, the company went 
bankrupt. The firm eventually survived before being taken over in 2006, but the fall of Worldcom 
hurt various stakeholders – shareholders and employees most notably. The US attorney general 
who investigated Worldcom bankruptcy blamed the CEO for the fall of Worldcom, as well as 
some top executive officers, who were later to be found guilty of accounting fraud – Worldcom 
CEO received a 25-year jail sentence. As reported by The New-York Times on June 10
th
 2003, 
the attorney general also blamed the “passive directors” who were approving every proposition 
the CEO made without even looking into it. Directors did not raise an eyebrow when the 
company announced the board made decisions they actually never had heard of.  
In another famous example, it was only when the Singapore margin exchange issued a mega-
margin call – shortly after the 1995 Kobe earthquake caused Asian markets to collapse – that the 
directors of the Barings Bank realized their star trader was actually a “rogue trader” who, instead 
of arbitraging as he was supposed to, took risky positions that resulted in losses so big they 
provoked the fall of the whole bank. 233 years old Barings Bank was afterwards bought by ING 
for a measly pound… Three of the bank’s directors where then suspended by the British 
Securities and Futures authority for lack of skill, care and diligence. More recently, a similar case 
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happened in France where Société Générale bank incurred a trading loss of almost €5billions, as 
one of their traders could, seemingly with ease, hide the fact that he was taken excessively risky 
positions. 
How could some boards remain unaware of the misconduct of some of their top managers – or, in 
the cases of the Barings or the Société Générale banks, of the lack of control of some of their top 
managers over misbehaving employees – to the point it actually led their company to 
bankruptcy? How could they be passive, or lack the necessary skills, when they were appointed 
by shareholders to supervise the management of their wealth? 
 
This raises the following questions that this review of literature addresses: 
1/ Why are there boards of directors in the first place? 
2/ What do the directors do? 
3/ How certain characteristics of the board of directors may impact the value of the company? 
That is, how can shareholders design a board that maximizes their wealth - instead of ruining 
them as well as other stakeholders? 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the general theoretical framework of 
corporate governance while section 3 describes the role of the board of directors. Section 4 
presents and discusses the literature on board composition and its impact on firm financial 
performance. 
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1.2. The Agency Theory 
1.2.1.  Conflict of interest 
 
Amongst the many definitions
2
 of corporate governance that have been given, one that is often 
referred to in finance was given by  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) who define corporate governance 
as “the ways in which supplier of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return 
on their investment”. That is, how investors such as shareholders and debtholders assure 
themselves that the company they invest their money in is well managed, and that the managers 
work in the best interests of shareholders instead of in their own. This raises a first concern about 
the conflict of interest that may exist between shareholders and debtholders. Both are fund 
providers and both expect a return on their investment but debtholders are prior claimants while 
shareholders are residual claimants. In other words, shareholders should not receive anything 
before the debt as been re-paid. Their investment is therefore more risky than this of debtholders 
and, under the assumption that risk and return are positively correlated
3
, shareholders should 
want the company to take more risk than debtholders would want. This particular conflict of 
interest between fund providers is not central to this thesis – a brief overview can be found in 
section 1.2.5. More central is the conflict of interest between the shareholders and the managers 
of the firm. 
While shareholders are the owners of the company, they most often do not run it themselves. 
Two simple reasons can be advanced to explain this fact: 1/ shareholders may be unwilling to do 
so – either because they do not think they are qualified to do it, or because it was not their 
                                                          
2
 See Monks and Minow (2001) or Clarke  for a discussion on different views on what corporate governance is. 
3
 An assumption widely accepted in finance as most models are based upon the risk-return trade-off, such as the 
well known Capital Asset Pricing Model. However, this assumption is challenged by what is known as the 
eponymous Bowman paradox (1980). 
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intention to run a company in the first place, just as a landlord may not intend to live in the 
house(s) he owns – and 2/ when there are a large number of multiple shareholders, such as is the 
case of most large companies today, the coordination costs between the shareholders to run the 
firm on a daily basis would be extremely high. Thus, shareholders appoint a manager or a 
management team with the mandate to run the company in order to maximize the shareholder 
value
4
. 
Between the management – the head of the company – and the shareholders – the owners of the 
company – lies the board of directors, whose members are elected or appointed by the 
shareholders – at least, formally. Section 1.1 of this thesis raised the question of the reason for the 
existence of boards of directors. Knowing that boards can fail and that they are costly – directors 
usually do not work for free, at least not in large companies – this question becomes: since 
shareholders already appoint managers to run the company, why do they need to appoint another 
costly body? 
Shareholders are legally required to appoint a board of directors. For instance, the US Model 
Business Corporation Act states that “all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the 
authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed by or under the direction 
of, its board of directors”. However, while having a board of directors is a legal requirement for 
companies in most countries, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) notice that they usually exceed 
legal requirements.  For instance, boards of directors are usually larger than required. If the only 
reason why shareholders appointed a board of directors was to comply with the law, it should be 
expected that they would not go further since there are costs associated with having a board of 
                                                          
4
 At least in the traditional perspective of the shareholder value. Section 1.2.6. of this thesis presents the discussion 
over the shareholder value perspective. 
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directors and that these costs – such as the directors’ compensation – grow with the size of the 
board. Hence, the board of directors should be beneficial to shareholders, or in other words they 
should help increase the shareholder value. In particular, can they help mitigate costly conflicts of 
interest between the shareholders and the management? 
 
1.2.2. The principal-agent problem 
 
Sir Adrian Cadbury, author of the famous eponymous report on corporate governance (1992), 
stated “I have always regarded Bob Tricker as the father of corporate governance”. While we 
acknowledge the major contributions of Bob Tricker and, in particular, of his 1984 book – that 
might have been the first one titled “Corporate Governance – to this field of research, it is our 
opinion that the cornerstone of corporate governance had in fact been laid long before.  When 
Adam Smith wrote in his seminal Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(1776) “the directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's 
money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private [firm] frequently watch over their own” he 
was building the foundations upon which would later be developed the agency theory, central to 
the corporate governance topic. 
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1.2.3. A simple illustration of the agency problem 
 
A simple example
5
 illustrates well the agency theory and the principal-agent problem. Whenever 
a water leak occurs in a house, the owner, or the occupant, of the house – assuming he does not 
have any plumbing skills and does not want to live in a flooded house – will usually call for the 
services of a plumber. The plumber does not work for free and will require to be paid in exchange 
for fixing the leak. Thus, the owner or occupant of the house hires an agent – the plumber – to 
perform a task – fixing the leak – he will benefit from – living in a non-flooded house in 
exchange for a salary. In the agency relation, who hires an agent- here, the owner or occupant of 
the house – is labeled as the principal of the agent. 
The agency problem arises when the agent has some latitude in performing the task he is paid for. 
In this example, the plumber can choose the level of effort he will exert and/or the amount of 
time he will spend performing the said task. We can also assume he can choose amongst 
materials of different quality to replace the defective ones. Different levels of effort and quality 
of materials should result in different outcomes. If the plumber is hasty and uses materials of poor 
quality, the leak will likely be fixed only for a short period of time before it starts flooding again. 
On the contrary, if the plumber is meticulous and uses high quality materials, chances are the 
owner or occupant of the house will not have to hire a plumber again for years. This situation, in 
which the agent can choose whether to dutifully perform the task he signed for or not to perform 
it – or to perform it lazily – is known as one of moral hazard. 
                                                          
5
 The author of this thesis must confess that this example is not his, as he was told of a close version of it, by one of 
his professors, when a master student. 
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Can the principal know whether or not the agent did a good job? Since we assume that the reason 
for which he decided to hire a plumber in the first place was his inability to fix the leak himself 
because he lacks the required skills, we can furthermore assume that he will not be able to tell the 
difference between a slapdash job and a work of art of plumbing. He therefore will not be able to 
bargain over the plumber’s wage based on his assessment of the plumber’s performance, nor will 
he be able to ask the plumber to do overtime in order to properly finish the job. Formally, there is 
an asymmetry of information between an informed agent – informed in that he knows the quality 
of the work he provides – and an uninformed principal. The only way for him to determine the 
quality of the plumbing work he ordered and of the material used will be to wait and see if the 
water starts leaking again in some months. As plumbers are usually unwilling to wait for months 
before being paid, the principal will therefore need to pay the plumber’s salary without knowing 
what exactly he pays for. 
The plumber can take advantage of the inability – or limited ability – of the principal to 
determine the quality of his work. Since he will be equally paid whether or not he uses expensive 
fine materials or cheap mediocre ones, whether or not he works hard or do a lazy job, a rational 
self-interested plumber should choose to maximize his utility by exerting a low level of effort and 
buying the cheapest available materials. In other words, due to the asymmetry of information 
between the principal and the agent, the latter can seize the opportunity to maximize his utility at 
the principal’s expense6. 
                                                          
6
 This example only aims at illustrating the principal-agent problem, and as such only constitutes a simplification of 
reality. One would be right to argue that a number of other variables may affect the plumber’s behavior: he may 
well seek to maximize his utility, but this is not necessarily the same thing as maximizing his wealth. Moreover, he 
might consider the reputational effect of doing a good (bad) job when choosing his level of effort. 
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In corporate governance, the agency theory is applied to shareholders, directors, managers and 
workers rather than to householders and plumbers. 
 
1.2.4. Corporate ownership and corporate control 
 
As underlined by Bearle and Means (1932), a corporation is legally owned by its shareholders but 
formally controlled by its management who do not need to be shareholders themselves. Managers 
therefore manage the wealth of others and, as stated by Smith (1776), have nothing to gain or lose 
from it, unless given an incentive to perform well. This conflict of interest is inevitable in large 
companies with multiple shareholders, when it would be inefficient, if not impossible, for 
shareholders to run the business themselves. Two important reasons for this 
inefficiency/impossibility are: 1/ the high coordination costs between a large number of 
shareholders and 2/ the fact that shareholders are not necessary competent enough to run the 
company – or at least, the fact that they could hire people with higher skills. In this perspective, a 
board of directors is a second best solution: since the owners of the company cannot manage the 
firm, they delegate this right to an elected board of directors, who they entitle to make important 
strategic decisions in their name. There are also responsible for hiring a management team who 
will run the company on a daily basis. In the traditional shareholder-value perspective, this team 
is assigned to maximize the shareholder value of the company, that is, to maximize the 
shareholders wealth. 
Since there is a conflict of interest between the management team and the shareholders, the board 
of directors is tasked with reducing this conflict of interest by inducing the top officers to act in 
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the shareholders best interest. To do so, they have two main tools at their disposal, usually 
referred to as “the carrot and the stick”: 1/ designing an ex ante financial incentive scheme that 
will make a high company performance worth the managers’ effort and 2/ monitoring the top 
management team to try to determine ex post if they behaved, with the possibility of penalizing 
them – by firing them, for instance – if they did not. Figure 1 is an illustration of the typical 
timeline of a principal-agent contract with ex ante incentive and ex post monitoring. Ex ante 
monitoring is also possible and often tied to ex post monitoring, because analyzing the company’s 
past decisions and outcomes may help alter further ones – under the assumption that they still can 
be. 
 
It is also worth noticing that monitoring can be and is often conducted by “complete” outsiders – 
who do not seat on the board. The most known of these outside monitors are probably the rating 
agencies and the analysts, whose job is to provide information about the prospects of the firms. 
Unlike shareholders, they do not have the direct power to punish misbehaving or incompetent 
management by removing them as directors or managers, but they do have an indirect power to 
constraint the management decisions by their impact on the stock price and on the rating of the 
corporate debt. However, the asymmetry of information is even more severe than with outside 
directors and this can lead more easily to incorrect statements. Companies are prone to contest 
outsider analyses content when they are unfavorable to them. For instance, LVMH – successfully 
– sued Morgan Stanley, accusing one of their analysts for issuing negative assessments they 
deemed untruthful. 
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Figure 1: Ex ante incentives ex post monitoring 
 
 
1.2.5.  Managerial incentive 
To mitigate the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers, managers can be given 
incentive in order to align their interest with this of the shareholders. The more wealth they create 
for the shareholders, the more managers are paid. A basic yet enlightening model of such tools 
can be found in Tirole (2006). It can be sum up as follows: 
A company invests in a project whose success depends on the level of effort exerted by the CEO. 
The project will succeed with a high probability 0Hp  if the CEO exerts an effort. If the CEO 
chooses to do so, he incurs a cost 0c  . If he does not, he does not incur any cost, and the 
probability of success of the project is reduced to a low probability 0Lp  with H Lp p . 
 28  
 
Regardless of the CEO’s chosen level of effort, the project requires the company to invest an 
amount 0I   and, in case of success, brings a revenue equal to 0R  . In case of failure, the 
project’s revenue equals 0. Moreover, it is assumed that 
Hp R I   so that the project would be 
funded if the CEO exerted an effort but that 
Lp R I   so that shareholders will incur a loss if he 
does not. 
In order to induce the CEO to behave, that is to exert an effort, shareholders can decide to give 
him an incentive, which take the form of a fraction  of the profit – or, equivalently in this 
model, a fraction of the company’s shares. Thus, the CEO, who wants to maximize his wealth, 
will exert an effort if the reward in case of success equals or exceeds the cost of effort, that is, if 
and only if: 
   H Lp R I c p R I          
which simplifies into: 
   H L
c
p p R I
  
  
 
where  is the minimum incentive to induce the CEO to exert an effort. Since the shareholders 
do not have any reason for granting the CEO more than he needs to behave, the CEO will be 
given a stake   in the company, should the shareholders decide to incentivize him. 
This model gives a simple overview of the theoretical foundation that lies behind incentive 
schemes, which can feature a wide variety of tools – bonuses, stocks, stock options, golden 
parachutes. While this is not the subject of this thesis, it is interesting to notice that incentive have 
a dark side. For instance, stock options are a powerful tool to induce managers to behave and act 
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in the shareholders’ best interest as they reward the holder only if the stock value reaches a pre-
determined value. Unlike simple stocks, stock-options do not reward the owner for nothing. 
However, they have an adverse effect: when the stock value is far enough of the option exercise 
price that the manager do not believe it can be reached by normal means, he may be inclined to 
take an excessive level of risk to boost return in a “gamble for resurrection”. In this perspective, 
highly unpopular golden parachutes can be seen as a tool to mitigate the adverse effect of stock-
options. Indeed, a golden parachute guarantees the CEO a reward even in the case where he is 
removed for failing to achieve his objectives, reducing the attraction of a risky gambling strategy. 
On the other hand, as shown by Johnson et al. (2009), simple stocks are more likely to give the 
management an incentive to fraud or produce misleading accounting reports, trying to artificially 
push the stock price to higher levels.  
Interestingly, what is true for the CEO and the management team can also be applied to other 
agents of the company, in particular directors, and employees – other than the members of the top 
management team. Indeed, the interests of the directors and shareholders are usually not aligned, 
establishing what Bebchuk and Weisbach (2011) qualify as a “complex three-way relationship” 
between shareholders, board members and managers. Directors thus need to be incentivized as 
well if they are to perform their duty in the shareholders’ best interest. While insiders, who work 
with and for the CEO have career concerns that may alter their incentives – see Raheja (2005) for 
instance – by making them more prone to side with the CEO, outsiders are generally seen as 
having their interests more aligned with these of shareholders, since, according to Fama and 
Jensen (1993) their career concern should give them an incentive to build a good reputation as 
monitors. But, as stated by Holmstrom (1999) one does not necessary need to be a good director 
to be perceived as one. And, as observed by Hermalin and Weisbach (2002) some outsiders may 
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also have an incentive to build a reputation of being “yes men” since they would be more likely 
to be offered positions in companies with weak governance. Furthermore, Patton and Baker 
(1987) argue that when directors are “creatures of the CEO”, they are in no position to fulfill 
efficiently their duties. 
If not properly incentivized, directors might find it more profitable to collude with the 
management and not exert any –costly – monitoring effort. Bourjade and Germain (2013) provide 
a theoretical model of optimal contracts in such a situation. Consistent with this theory is Perry 
(2000) who finds that when independent directors are given incentives, the sensitivity of the CEO 
turnover to the firm performance increases. 
While the impact of debtholders on a company’s governance is not the object of this thesis, it is 
worth noticing that they too have a stake in the management actions, and that they too have 
conflicting interests with the shareholders. Because debtholders have a prior claim on the firm 
cash-flows – compared to shareholders, who are residual claimants – they are usually better-off 
when the firm invests in projects with low risk and return, provided the return is still large 
enough for the company to pay off its debt. As outsiders – except in particular cases such as when 
a debtholder is also a shareholder – debtholders are not involved in the firm’s decision process; 
however, to prevent shareholders opportunism, they can introduce covenants in a debt contract 
that will limit the choices available to the company – typically, by setting a limit to some of the 
firm’s financial ratios. Thus, debtholders do have a direct impact on a company’s corporate 
governance. Figure 2 illustrates visually the corporate governance structure and the multiple 
conflicts of interest. 
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Figure 2: Corporate Governance Structure 
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1.2.6. Other stakeholders 
Shareholders and debtholders are neither the only agents who have a stake in a company’s 
decisions nor are they the only ones involved in its governance process. Indeed, while the 
shareholder value, the traditional theory in finance, states that the only goal of a company should 
be to maximize the wealth of its owner, the tenants of the stakeholder society, notably Freeman et 
al.  (2007), claim that corporations have duties and responsibilities to a number of stakeholders, 
including shareholders but also employees, communities, customers, creditors, etc. Therefore, 
proponents of the stakeholder society claim that firms should put more focus than they do on 
avoiding layoffs – or even on creating more jobs, on reducing negative externalities on the 
environment, etc. Tirole (2006) gives a good overview of the debate, which we briefly sum-up 
thereafter. 
While the stakeholder society is seen favorably by public opinions, in particular in Europe, it has 
been rejected by most scholars for various reasons, mainly: 
- Empowering non shareholders with a right to make decisions for the firm would dilute 
shareholders power and deter investment 
- While maximizing shareholder value is a clear objective and management can be 
incentivized relatively easily, maximizing stakeholder welfare is a lot more complex to 
defined and it would be extremely difficult to hold managers accountable for barely 
valuable externalities– leading to impossible contracts. 
As Milton Friedman, a fierce tenant of the shareholder value, puts it: “There is one and only one 
social responsibility of business — to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
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increase its profits so long as it … engages in open and free competition, without deception or 
fraud
7.” 
However, if shareholder value remains the main analysis tool, an increasing number of studies 
seem to suggest that social responsibility may actually positively impact the shareholder value. 
Margolis et al. (2007) run a meta-analysis and find that more socially responsible companies 
enjoy slightly better performance. Magill et al. (2013) offer a theoretical framework of 
stakeholder equilibrium. While the purpose of this thesis is not to enter this debate, we 
interestingly show in chapter 2 that employee representation on the board of directors may, when 
certain conditions are met, be beneficial to shareholders, managers and employees alike. 
 
  
                                                          
7
 In The New-York Times, September 13, 1970. 
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1.3. What do boards of directors do? 
  
According to Mace (1971) the role of directors is to provide advices to the management as well 
as overseeing their actions. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) also argue that they act as a “safe-
guard” to shareholders and managers. However, Demb and Neubauer (1992) show that directors 
themselves somewhere differ with this idea of their roles. Indeed, while most of them agree that 
their tasks include an involvement in the firm strategic choices, only a minority consider 
monitoring as a part of their duties. Only a quarter of them believe they should be responsible for 
dismissing or hiring the CEO or the members of the management. Removal being one of the main 
tools a board of directors can use to punish a misbehaving or dismiss an incompetent CEO, if 
directors do not use this tool, the monitoring they may well exert is somewhat useless, since it is 
not tied to any credible threat to the management. Lapdog boards of directors could be an 
explanation to the number of corporate scandals that the pas decades saw happened. 
 
However, MacAvoy and Millstein (1999) believe that the real role of the boards of directors has 
been evolving since these early studies. Increased shareholder activism – the California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) for instance has build a reputation of being a 
particularly demanding investor – and stronger regulations – such as the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act in the United States – have made boards tougher in their overseeing of the management, and 
more independent of the CEO. As shown by figure 3, recent governance codes and reports have 
emphasized the independence of the board of directors. In some countries such as the United 
States, requirements regarding the independence of the boards have been made a legal obligation 
(hardlaw) through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), while in some others, notably in Europe, the 
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unofficial “comply or explain” rule (softlaw) have been preferred. Under this rule, companies are 
asked by the market to meet some requirements regarding governance but have the possibility to 
deviate from these common rules if they can provide investors with a convincing explanation that 
the company specific situation makes compliance impossible or too costly. 
 
Figure 3: Rules of different code of corporate governance 
Source: Tirole J., The Theory of Corporate Finance (2006), p.35 
 
 
A number of studies show that boards do indeed play a role in corporate governance and it seems 
established that since the 1980’s board of directors have became more willing to defend 
shareholders interest rather than siding with the management. 
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Indeed, Hermalin (1988) shows that the sensitivity of the CEO turnover to the firm performance 
is higher in boards that are dominated by outsiders, suggesting that more independent directors 
are more prone to take sanctions against the management. Similarly, Kaplan (1994) shows that 
management turnover in Germany in the 1980’s is sensitive to the stock performance of the firm 
and that removal of the incumbent management is more likely following bad stock performance. 
It is worth noticing that there exist differences across countries, with Germany being one where 
the sensitivity appears to be the strongest (see figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 Top executive turnover and stock return chart  
Source: Tirole J., The Theory of Corporate Finance (2006), p.26. Built on data in Kaplan (1994) 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, Morck et al. (1989) find this to be less true in small firms that are run by the 
founder. Indeed, this type of firms generally has a weaker governance system, provided that the 
historical CEO has more control over the board of directors, not only because of his tenure but 
also because he has often remained an important shareholder. 
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However, if there is overwhelming evidence establishing a sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm 
performance, this does not necessary implies that boards effectively monitor the CEO. They 
could for instance remove CEOs following bad performance under shareholder pressure or only 
by looking at the stock price – what shareholders can do by themselves at a lesser cost. 
 
One may ask if the shareholders really need to hire and pay directors to monitor the managers, or 
if they could do it themselves by analyzing the firm accounting statements and stock performance 
and decide, based on this analysis, to keep or dismiss the management – or to buy or sell shares. 
Cornelli et al. (2013) give a positive answer to this question. Using an exogenous change in the 
law of former communist countries from Eastern Europe, they show that directors go beyond the 
firms’ statements to try and detect if the performance is due to luck – or bad luck – to avoid firing 
managers who make “honest mistakes”. However, Jenter and Kanaan (2015) find that CEOs 
remain more likely to be dismissed following bad industry and bad market performance. 
 
Tosi et al. (2000) provide a meta-analysis of the empirical studies on the determinants of the CEO 
pay. They find that the firm performance accounts for around 5% of the CEO pay when the size 
of the firm accounts for approximately 40%. While the sensitivity of the CEO pay to the firm 
performance is seen as a sign of good governance, the large role played by the size of the firm is 
less enthusing. The compensation of a properly incentivized CEO should mainly depend on the 
shareholder value he creates, that is on the firm financial performance. The fact that it actually 
depends more on the size of the company he runs can be perceived as a sign of weak governance. 
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Hermalin (2005) predicts that more independent boards should be more diligent in monitoring the 
CEO to try and determine his ability and should also be more prone to replace a CEO when they 
have uncertainty about the CEO’s competence. This should lead to a shorter CEO tenure and 
more CEO’s efforts, to try to avoid removal. Hence, in turn, higher level of independence of the 
board of directors could lead to an increase in the CEO remuneration to reward the greater effort 
and compensate the lesser secure position. 
 
Figure 5: Summary of Hermalin 2005 model 
Source: Adams R. et al., The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A 
Conceptual Framework and Survey (2010), p. 70 
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1.4. Optimal Board Composition 
 
1.4.1. Board size 
Most studies suggest that smaller boards of directors are more efficient and that firms with 
smaller boards have higher value. Yermack (1996) finds that smaller boards are associated with a 
higher firm value for large US companies between 1984 and 1991. He also finds that the link 
between poor performance and CEO turnover is stronger in firms where the board is of smaller 
size, which suggests that smaller boards are more efficient monitors. Guest (2009) finds similar 
results with a sample of listed UK firms between 1981 and 2002 with smaller boards associated 
with a higher market value, higher profitability and higher stock returns. Higher coordination 
costs and poor communication leading to bad decisions are often advanced as one of the main 
reasons for the inefficiency of large boards. In an innovative set up Bennedsen et al. (2008), use a 
sample of small and medium-sized firms, and establish a positive link between the size of the 
board of directors and the number of the CEO’s children, suggesting that the CEO has enough 
power to put his relatives on the board of directors. Consistent with other studies, they find a 
negative link between the size of the board (number of the CEO’s children) and the firm 
performance. 
 
Gertner and Kaplan (1996) innovate by studying the size of the boards of firms in the case of 
reverse leverage buyouts. The most usual objective of a leverage buyout is to buy a firm, delist it, 
and restructure it to maximize its shareholder value before re-listing it. Hence, LBO specialists 
are supposed to lead the firm to its optimal structure. Gertner and Kaplan (1996) find that in 
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reverse leverage buyouts, firms have a smaller board size, suggesting small board indeed 
increases the shareholder value. 
 
While this negative link is robust across most studies, Bermig and Frick (2010), using a sample 
from the particular case of codetermination in Germany find no link between board size and 
company performance or value. 
 
Other studies investigate the determinants of board size. Amongst many others, O’Sullivan 
(2000), Lehn et al. (2009), or Coles et al. (2008) find that more complex firms have larger, more 
independent boards. They find the relation between the size of the board and the firm value to be 
U-shaped: not only small boards but also large boards are associated with a high Tobin’s Q. 
Denis and Sarin (1999) also find changes in the board structure, as well as in the firm ownership, 
to be exogenously determined by economic shocks. 
 
1.4.2. Insiders, outsiders and independent directors 
As explained previously, the existence of asymmetry of information is an important reason for 
the possibility for the agent to misbehave. In the “plumber example”, the principal could not 
assess the quality of the agent’s work, at least not before paying him. The situation in a 
corporation is similar with the CEO as the agent and the board of directors as the principal – or 
with other configurations such as the board of directors as the agent and the shareholders as the 
principal. Indeed, while the CEO perfectly knows what he does, these who are tasked to monitor 
him – the directors – cannot know his every move. However, all directors do not have equal 
access to information on the CEO’s behavior and on the firm’s activities. Insiders, who are 
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members of the top management team who also sit on the board of directors, have a privileged 
access to private information about the company and the CEO’s actions. On the contrary, 
outsiders who sit on the board but do not work for the company on a daily basis have limited 
access to inside information. 
 
Thus, insiders are in a better position than outsiders to assume efficiently the two main roles of 
the board of directors: to advice and monitor or, as Mace (1971) puts it “to serve as a source of 
advice and counsel, serve as some sort of discipline, and act in crisis situation”. 
 
The downside is that insiders, as members of the top management team have a hierarchal link 
with the CEO. That is, their position and career advancement depends on the very person they are 
supposed to monitor. Thus, insiders may be induced to refrain in monitoring the CEO or the top 
management team… they are a part of. 
 
In this perspective, selecting board members can be seen as a trade-off between having a lapdog 
board and a watchdog board, that is, between a well-informed board unwilling to monitor the 
CEO and a board with a high intensity of monitoring but lacking information to efficiently fulfill 
their task. This theoretical dilemma is backed by Weisbach (1988) who establishes that the link 
between CEO turnover and firm performance is stronger when the board is dominated by 
outsiders. 
 
It is worth noting, as explained by Charreaux and Wirtz (2006) that the notion of “outsider” is 
progressively replaced by this of “independent director” or “independent outsider”. The reason 
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for this is that outsiders may well not be hierarchically linked to the CEO but they could still have 
a dependence relationship. Amongst the most obvious examples is cross directorship, when the 
CEO of company A sits on the board of directors of company B, whose CEO in turn sits on the 
board of directors of company A, or this of a family link – particularly in family owned 
companies. Kramarz and Thesmar (2013) also show that CEOs and directors can be linked trough 
social networks, and that this is associated with weak governance and worse firm performance. 
Another, and more tenuous, possibility, related to the third chapter of this thesis is the possible 
link between a director and a CEO through politics. A company may indeed, when legally 
allowed, as is the case some countries such as the United States, contribute to the campaign of a 
candidate for an office through financial donations. When this very candidate also happens to sit 
on the board of the company which contributes to his campaign, he may be unwilling to be a 
thorough monitor as the CEO could retaliate by deciding to switch horses. Thus, independent 
directors are considered to be more concerned with the maximization of shareholder value than 
insiders as their interests are more aligned – or less unaligned – than these of insiders. 
 
The number of independent directors on the board of directors has dramatically increased over 
the past decades and has became a requirement in most developed countries under various forms 
– having a majority of independent directors is for instance a requirement for a company listed on 
the New-York Stock Exchange. Gordon (2007) shows that the proportion of independent 
directors on the boards of large public companies in the United States has risen from around 20% 
in 1950 to 75% in 2005. This rise has been particularly strong between 1985 and 2005, as can be 
seen on figure 6. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) find similar results when studying the 
impact of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
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Figure 6 Board Composition in the US 
Source: Gordon J.N., The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices (2007), p. 1474 
 
 
1.4.3. CEO and chairmanship titles 
The CEO’s bargaining power and/or directors lack of activism may lead to the paradoxical 
situation where the CEO effectively controls both the company and the board of directors. In 
1932, Berle and Means noticed that “Control will tend to be in the hands of those who select the 
proxy committee and by whom, the election of directors for ensuing period will be made. Since 
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the proxy committee is appointed by the existing management, the latter can virtually impose his 
own successors”. Things have changed, and today most boards of large companies have a 
nomination committee whose task is to find and select new directors. But this evolution toward 
more independent boards of directors has been and still is relatively slow. Thus, there are still a 
number of CEOs who also assume chairmanship of the board of directors – the very body in 
charge of overseeing them, in particular in smaller firms, as figure 7 exhibits. 
 
Figure 7: Evolution of the Separation of CEO and Chairman Titles 
Source: Tribbett C., Splitting The CEO and Chairman Roles – Yes or No? (2012), p. 5 
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Brickley et al. (1997) find that firms in which the two titles are separated outperform firms where 
they are combined. Goyal and Park (2002) study the CEO turnover relative to firm performance 
in the light of this separation of titles. They find that when the CEO assumes both roles, he is less 
likely to be removed following bad performance that when the two titles are separated. This 
suggests that boards of directors are more efficient when not headed by the CEO. Indeed, when 
the titles are combined, the CEO is more able to influence the decisions taken by the board as 
shown in Adams et al. (2005) resulting in a less independent board, regardless of the proportion 
of independent directors. 
Interestingly, Anderson et al. (2005) establish a positive link between the separation of titles and 
more informative earning statements. 
 
1.4.4. Independence of the board and shareholder value 
If more emphasis has been put on the importance of independent directors and if their numbers 
have consistently grown under the pressure of shareholder activists, the most important question 
– from a shareholder value perspective – remains: to determine whether or not they have a 
positive impact on the firm financial performance and on the shareholder value. A significant 
number of empirical studies have been led to try and answer this question, with mitigated results. 
 
In a seminal paper on the topic, Bhagat and Black (1999) conduct a large sample study 
investigating the relation between the independence of the board of directors of large American 
public companies and the long-term performance of said companies. Their results show no such 
correlation. They however find that low profitability firms tends to increase the independence of 
their board of directors but do not find any evidence that this increased independence is beneficial 
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to shareholders. This is consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) who do not find any 
correlation between board independence and firm performance but show that poor performance 
tends to modify the board structure. Indeed, following poor performance, they show that insiders 
are more likely to leave the board while outsiders are more likely to join it. 
 
These studies, along with others, shed light on two issues: 1/ the link between board 
independence and firm performance might not be as clear as commonly acknowledged and 2/ the 
causal relation works both way. This means that while board composition may impact 
performance or at least some of the actions taken by the firm, the firm performance impacts the 
board structure with an increase in the degree of independence following poor performance. This 
endogeneity problem is quite common in corporate governance, and more particularly in the case 
of board of directors’ composition. 
 
Indeed, when trying to determine the impact on performance of the presence of directors with 
some characteristics – independence, gender,... – the main issue is that boards’ composition may 
change following bad performance or, as shown by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), that the CEO 
may interfere in the selection of new directors if he has enough bargaining power. They suggest 
that his bargaining power is associated with the firm performance. Hence, the degree of 
independence of the board of directors is likely to increase following bad performance, which 
could lead to counter-intuitive empirical results with higher independence levels of the board of 
directors associated with lower firm performance. The attempts that have been made to 
circumvent this problem by taking into account past performance using simultaneous equations 
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by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) or Bhagat and Black (2002) have not been successful in 
finding a positive impact of independence on performance. 
 
Since the absence of proof is not the proof of absence, a number of reasons have been advanced 
to explain why the link might be difficult to establish. MacAvoy and Millstein (1999) argue that, 
at least until the 2000’s, boards of directors have not been fulfilling there role: in particular, they 
have been monitoring the management teams they were supposed to oversee, which would 
explain the multiplication of corporate scandals during the past decades. 
 
While the literature offers contrasted results on the direct link between board independence and 
shareholder value, some studies suggest that a greater independence might still benefit 
shareholders.  
Anderson et al. (2005) thus find a positive link between the board independence and the 
informativeness of earnings. Rosenstein and Watt (1990) find a positive limited stock reaction to 
the announcement of the appointment of an outsider director, suggesting that investors value 
outside more than inside directors. So do Block (1999), who also finds that the positive effect on 
stock price of the announcement of the appointment of an outsider diminishes with the number of 
outsiders already in place, suggesting that a moderate level of independence might be deemed 
optimal by the market. 
 
Amongst the reasons why an increased presence of non-executive directors on the board may 
adversely affect firm performance, Goodstein et al. (2006) argue that diversity may hamper 
strategic decision making.  
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1.4.5. Independence and information 
The trade-off between information and independence has been one of the main reasons advanced 
for explaining why empirical studies might have failed to establish a positive link between the 
degree of independence of the board and the financial performance of the firm. 
Adams and Ferreira (2007) provide a theoretical model in which the optimal board repartition 
between insiders and independent directors is sensitive to the asymmetry of information. In their 
model, the shareholders hire a CEO and a board of directors tasked to advise and monitor him. 
They select the level of independence of the board by choosing the distribution of insiders and 
independent directors inside the board. While insiders have better access to private information 
about the firm’s prospective projects, they are dependent on the CEO for their career 
advancement. On the other hand, independent directors can either obtain information if the CEO 
decides to reveal it to them or if they incur a monitoring cost. Since the CEO can receive private 
benefits from the company investing in a suboptimal project, he is unwilling to share information 
with a board that have a high intensity of monitoring. Thus, under some conditions, a high level 
of board independence not only deter the CEO to share information but also prevent the 
independent directors to provide accurate advices – since the lack of information affect their 
ability to efficiently council. If the independence level is sufficiently low that the CEO is 
confident the board will not monitor him, he will reveal his private information which helps 
directors give better advices. 
Hence, when choosing the degree of independence of the board, shareholders face a trade-off 
between the intensity of monitoring and the quality of the advices provided by the board. As a 
consequence, Adams and Ferreira show that depending on the importance of private information 
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for the company’s project, shareholders might be better off with boards with low degree of 
independence, what the authors label as “friendly boards”. 
 
Interestingly, this theory gives some support in favor of a division of the board into a dual 
structure, with a board in charge of the monitoring part and another tasked with advising. If both 
boards are independent from one another – or that the exchange of information between the two 
is sufficiently low, the CEO and top management team may find it easier to share their 
information with the advising board, since they know this information will not be used against 
them. Such a two-tier structure with a supervisory board and a management board is most 
common in some European countries such as Germany. The increased number of committees 
inside traditional board of directors can be seen as a form of copy of this dual structure. Belot et 
al. (2013) show that in France – where firms can choose to have either a one- or a two-tier board 
– unitary boards are associated with high asymmetry of information.  
 
Coles et al. (2008) give some backing to Adams and Ferreira friendly boards theory by showing 
that for R&D-intensive firms, where private information held by insiders is more important, the 
firm value increases with the fraction of insiders on the board of directors. 
 
Raheja (2005) provides another theoretical model to try and show how independent directors can 
extract information from insiders. Her model also provides support to Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998) who find that companies tend to select more insider directors when the CEO is expected 
to retire soon, which they interpret as a manner of vetting possible successors for the CEO.  
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In this model, she assumes that the CEO must propose to the board of directors to invest in one of 
two possible projects. The board of directors is composed of insiders and outsiders. Only one of 
the two projects is beneficial for the shareholders. The CEO and insiders receive a private benefit 
if the board decides to invest in the project that does not increase shareholder value but none in 
the other case. The outsiders want to maximize the shareholder value. To account for the 
asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders, she assumes that all insiders knows 
which is the good project and which is the bad one while outsiders can learn it either by incurring 
a verification cost or by obtaining the information from an insider. If they do not acquire 
information, the company invests in the project chosen by the CEO, who will retire afterward, but 
not before he has chosen one of the insiders to succeed him. If the independent directors find out 
which project is the better, and assuming either that they hold a majority of the seats or that they 
and the “cooperative” insiders hold a majority of the seats, they overrule the CEO in the choice of 
the project, and they choose his successor amongst the cooperative insiders, if any, or they bring 
an outsider to take the CEO’s succession if no insider chose to reveal his information. 
Thus, insiders face a dilemma between “betraying” the CEO and staying loyal to him. The more 
insiders there are in the board, the smaller the probability for an insider that the CEO will 
designate him as his successor. If insiders hold most of the seats on the board, betraying the CEO 
can only be beneficial if enough insiders choose to do so, so that outsiders and cooperative 
insiders can form a majority to overrule the CEO’s choice. Hence, when the cost the outsiders 
must incur in order to obtain information – that is, if no insider cooperates – shareholders might 
be better off with a large number of insiders in the board since it exacerbates competition 
between them and gives greater incentives to cooperate with outsiders. Raheja argues that this 
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implies that boards with a high number of insiders are more likely to be optimal in sectors or in 
firms where acquiring information is more costly. 
 
Both models, along with others – such as Laux (2008) or Harris and Raviv (2008) – emphasize 
the key role of information transmission in the board decision process and on the ability of the 
CEO to impact this transmission to avoid monitoring and/or to remain effectively in charge of the 
firm’s investment decisions. 
 
1.4.6. Women on the board of directors 
While boards of directors have long been hegemonically masculine, a trend towards equal gender 
representation has developed in the 1990’s and women representation has reached levels closer to 
equality, at least in the boards of large companies and in most developed countries, as shown by 
figure 8. This has been often achieved through legal requirements. Countries such as France, 
Norway or Spain have indeed made it mandatory for large companies to have an equal gender 
representation on the board of directors
8
. However, there are still significant discrepancies, as the 
proportion of women on the board of directors of S&P500-listed companies was only 22% in 
2014 while it was close to 40% in large Norway companies. 
 
While the link between women representation on the board of directors and firm performance is 
unclear, some studies establish interesting effects of women presence. 
                                                          
8
 Gender equality on corporate boards is for instance legally required by the law Loi n° 2011-103, January 27
th
 2011 
in France for companies with a turnover greater than €50millions or with more than 500 employees. 
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Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that gender adversity has an average negative impact on the firm 
performance, this impact being mainly driven by the companies with the strongest governance – 
they use the takeover defenses to proxy for the quality of governance, fewer defenses being the 
sign of a better governance. They interpret this as the fact that mandatory gender diversity 
adversely affects the firms which are already well-governed. They also find that female directors 
have a better attendance record to board meetings than their male counterparts, and that male 
attendance increases with gender-diversity. They also find that women are more likely to join 
monitoring committees. 
 
Farrell and Hersch (2005) find that women tend to serve on the board of directors of better 
performing firms but do not find any significant stock abnormal return on the announcement of 
the nomination of a woman on the board of directors. They interpret their results as the gender-
neutrality of firm performance. 
 
This is consistent with Burgess and Tharenou (2002) who find no relation between women 
nomination on the board and their perceived competence. 
 
Contrary to Adams and Ferreira, Campbell and Vera (2007) find a positive link between board 
gender-diversity and firm performance in Spain. 
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Figure 8: Proportion of Women on Boards of Directors 
Source: Ethics & Boards Governance Analytics (2014) 
 
 
1.4.7. Employee representatives on the board 
Another type of directors has enjoyed greater attention from scholars: employee representatives. 
Employee representatives are elected by their peers with the task to defend their interests and 
provide the board with the opinion and advice of the employees of the firm. 
What strikes with employee representation is the wide diversity of situations and the strong 
differences that exist across countries. While some countries – such as Germany – are known for 
their high level of employee representation, in some others – such as the US – it is virtually non-
existent. 
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While most countries tend to develop similar rules and close principles in most corporate 
governance aspects, employee representation appears not to follow this worldwide trend. 
We believe the reason for this is that until very recently, the economic and financial 
considerations were excluded from the debate over employee representation. The German case 
illustrates this well. 
Germany has developed a very strong codetermination – or Mitbestimmung – system. German 
companies employing more than 500 workers are legally required to allocate a third of the seats 
on the supervisory board to employee representatives. For firms with more than 2,000 employees, 
this proportion rises to half of the seats. The current mandatory codetermination in Germany 
ensues from the 1976 Codetermination Act – Mitbestimmungsgesetz. But Germany has a very 
long history of codetermination and the very beginning of employee representation can be found 
as early as 1848 in Frankfurt
9
. During that year the Parliament of Frankfurt – the first freely 
elected parliament on German territory – passed a law requiring that work councils be created. Of 
course, codetermination was only in embryo, but the time when it happened matters, as the 
Frankfurt Parliament was elected following the March Revolution, while workers militancy was 
particularly high. Later on, at the beginning of the 20
th
 century, work councils were to be formed 
in the mining industry as an answer to miners’ strikes. Disbanded in 1941 under the Nazi regime, 
the work councils were introduced again after the World War 2 by the British military occupation 
forces, concerned about the involvement in the German war machine of steel industry CEOs, and 
anxious to prevent them to gain too much power. 
                                                          
9
 Pernickety historians will notice that what we describe as the laying of the very first brick of codetermination did 
not occur in actual Germany but rather in the free city of Frankfurt, within the German Confederation.  
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The French case is also enlightening, as the first significant step towards employee representation 
was taken in 1983 as the first left-wing government
10
 France had known since 1957 had the 
parliament pass an act introducing employee representation on the board of directors of state-
owned companies. This act was slightly reinforced in 1986, under a right-wing government as a 
way to sweeten the pill of the so-called “privatization wave”. The current law ruling employee 
representation in France is a 2013 act – also voted by a left-wing parliament – which has 
extended the scope of the law, by requiring a minimal level of employee representation on the 
board of the largest firms – with more than 5,000 employees domestically or more than 10,000 
worldwide.  
 
With the examples given in this section, we intend to point out the fact that the determinants for 
employee representation are – or at least have been – of a highly political nature. 
 
However, the French 2013 act was interestingly based on economical arguments. It was indeed 
passed following the release of the Gallois report (2012) arguing that limited employee 
representation should help improve the competitiveness of French industry and to mitigate the 
supposedly negative impact of the supposed shareholders short-termism. Chapter 2 of this thesis 
proposes a theoretical model of employee representation accounting for shareholders investment 
horizon. 
                                                          
10
 This was actually the third of three governments headed by the same prime minister between 1981 and 1984. 
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 As can be seen from German and French cases, not only the existence of employee 
representation varies from one country to another, but the level of representation also differs. 
While under the German law, large firms are required to have at least a third of the seats on the 
supervisory board allocated to employee representatives, under the French law employee 
representatives are entitled to only one or two seats on the board. The reason for this difference is 
likely to be found in the board structure. While German boards are two-tier boards with a 
supervisory and a management boards, French boards can be either one- or two-tier. This means 
that if German codetermination gives employees an important role in monitoring the 
management, it does not give them any right in strategic decision making and thus does not dilute 
the shareholders property rights. This might very well explain why the Bullock report (1977) 
proposing that codetermination was introduced in the United Kingdom, where boards are one-
tier, went unheeded. 
 
Importantly, employee representation on the board of directors can take at least two forms: 
employee-directors who are elected by their peers as employee representatives, or employee-
directors who are elected by employee shareholders as representatives of this particular category 
of shareholders. With this enlarged version of employee representation, as much as 36% of 
employees were represented in the board of their company in Europe in 2013 according to the 
European Federation of Employee Share Ownership. The impact on the firm shareholder value is 
unclear as of yet but stock performance of companies with different levels of employee 
participation suggests it could differ with said level (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9: Employee Ownership and Stock Performance in the UK 
Source: UK Employee Ownership Index (2015), 
http://www.employeeownershipindex.co.uk/wiki/images/0/0c/Home-page-chart-20150714.png 
 
The impact of employee representation on the boards of directors on firm performance and on 
shareholder value is unclear as there are controversial theoretical arguments as well as contrasted 
empirical findings. Jensen and Meckling (1979) argue that since employee representation can 
only be found in countries where it is a legal requirement, it is detrimental to shareholders – 
assuming that companies naturally evolve towards their most efficient form. However, Fauver 
and Fuerst (2006) oppose an interesting argument based on the prisoner’s dilemma principle. 
They say that employee representation might indeed act as a CEO repellent, and that companies 
with no such representation would thus find it easier to attract the best managers while firms 
granting employees some board seats would be left with second choice managers. However, if all 
comparable companies are required to have employee representation this dilemma disappears, or 
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is at least mitigated. Consistently, but unlike Gorton and Schmid (2004), they find evidence of a 
positive impact of some degree of employee representation on German firms Tobin’s Q.  
 
1.4.8. Bankers on the board of directors 
The presence of a banker on the board of directors is quite common. Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) 
show that when a banker representing a company’ lender seats on the board of directors, the firm 
exhibits a lower leverage. Non-lending bankers sitting on the board can either provide monitoring 
when the firm is in a situation of financial distress or advice when it is not. 
Krozner and Strahan (2001) find that having a seat on the board of directors is a manner for 
banks to reduce insolvability risk. They show that bankers tend to sit on large stable firms with 
high levels of tangible assets, which can be collateralized. They state that the different levels of 
banker’s protection across countries are a determinant of the presence of bankers on the board of 
directors. 
Charumilind, et al. (2006) find that Thai companies connected to a bank or to politician have 
greater access to credit availability and are required less collateral. 
If bankers can be helpful directors for a company, they might be tempted to help themselves first. 
Indeed, Ferreira and Matos (2012) find that when a lending bank has a seat on the board of 
directors of a company, it serves more often as a lead arranger and charge higher rate. Ferreira 
and Matos argue that this is some form of looting. 
Güner et al. (2008) also suggest that bankers who seat on the board of directors of companies 
have conflicting interests, as they find evidence of increased inefficiency in such situations. For 
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instance, they find that firms with a banker on the board issue a larger amount of bonds, but 
realize worse acquisitions. 
 
1.4.9. Politically connected directors and firms 
A number of firms have politically connected directors, or politicians, on their board, with many 
famous cases such as the well known ties between some Texan oil companies and the Bush 
family in the United States, or former French minister Montebourg now serving on the 
supervisory board of Habitat after his appointment in March 2015. A politically connected 
director can be defined using Faccio (2006) definition of a politically connected firm as a current 
or former head of state, or a current of former member of the government or of the parliament, or 
closely related – family tied or close friend – to someone fitting one of the listed categories. In 
Faccio’s cross-country sample, almost 3% of the firms are politically connected – also not always 
through a member of the board since Faccio’s definition extends to the company top management 
team members and large shareholders. There are some strong discrepancies across countries, as 
almost 20% of Malaysia firms are found to be connected while only 0.002% of the US firms are. 
We however find in chapter 3 a more important proportion of connected firms, of at least 10%, a 
result partially driven by the new definition we introduce. 
 
Empirical findings of most studies suggest that firms derive benefit from political connections. 
Faccio (2006) Khwaja and Myan (2005), Charumilind et al. (2006) find that politically connected 
firms are able to raise more debt, either that they exhibit a higher leverage, or that they enjoy 
greater access to credit than non-politically connected companies. 
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The results are contrasted as regards the financial performance of politically connected firms, but 
overall results seem to suggest that they enjoy an increased performance and shareholder value. If 
Faccio (2006) find that politically connected firms have a worse accounting performance, 
Boubakri et al. (2008) find otherwise.  
A reason to explain these inconsistent results could lie in the political color of the link. Goldman, 
Rocholl and So (2009) find that the value of US firms connected to the Republican party 
increased following the election of the Republican candidate in the 2000 presidential election 
while the value of US firms connected to the Democrat party decreased. In other words, it pays to 
bet on the right horse. Similarly, Ferguson and Voth (2008) find that firms who financially 
supported the German Nazi party before 1933 outperformed their competitors after Hitler seized 
power. 
Therefore, politically connected firms seem to benefit from being connected to the incumbent 
power. However, this may not be a free lunch. Boubakri et al. (2013) find that politically 
connected firms hold more cash than others and argue that this cash reserve could be a sign that 
politically connected firms are used as “cash cows” by politicians. Similarly, Bertrand et al. 
(2007) show that politically connected French firms create more jobs and destroy less plants 
around election years in the more politically contested departments, suggesting that there is a 
price to pay either for being connected or to try to maintain an incumbent connected leader in 
power. 
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Abstract 
 
We develop a model of corporate board including employee representatives in addition to 
shareholders and top executives. In line with the empirical literature, our model shows that low 
levels of employee representation may increase the shareholder value, even in the presence of a 
conflict of interest between employee representatives and other directors because employees hold 
specific valuable private information. We also show that a minority employee representation may 
cause the board to switch from a short-term to a long-term strategy. Such a strategy switch is 
always in the employees’ interest and can be beneficial or detrimental to shareholders as well as 
top executives.  Thus, employee representation can be beneficial to shareholders as well as other 
stakeholders. However, employee representation may be harmful for firms whose shareholder 
base has a short time horizon such as venture capitalists. 
Keywords: corporate governance, board composition, employee representation, employee 
directors, codetermination.  
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1.1. Introduction 
 
Over the last few years one of the very central ideas in finance, that the main objective of a firm’s 
management should be to maximize the shareholder value, has come under increased criticism. 
Not only has this view been questioned by the public opinion, as newspapers articles show
11
, but 
academics have also challenged the shareholder theory, mainly arguing that focusing on 
shareholder value has important negative externalities on stakeholders, and could even result in 
shareholders being worse-off. The possible negative impact of shareholder value maximization 
has been studied in particular by Stout (2012) and Magill et al. (2013).  
This raises the timely question of the impact of employee representation on the board of 
directors. While corporate boards have been thoroughly studied over the past decades, the role of 
employee-elected directors has not enjoyed as much attention as other aspects of governance. 
This is all the more surprising that, if employee representation is negligible in some countries – 
such as the US or the UK – it is well developed – and developing – in others, mainly European, 
with the German codetermination system being the most famous example. Yet, employees are 
stakeholders whose interests may diverge from shareholders’ and employee representation may 
cause the board to deviate from shareholder value maximization. 
We develop what is to our knowledge the first model of corporate board including employee 
representation. In line with most empirical studies on the subject, we show that, because 
employees can share valuable private information with the board, employee representation can 
                                                          
11
 Two recent examples from the Washington Post and from the Guardian: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/09/how-the-cult-of-shareholder-value-wrecked-
american-business/ and http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/blog/maximising-shareholder-value-
irony 
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increase the revenue of the firm, even if the interests of the workers are conflicting with these of 
the shareholders.  
Importantly, we show that a minority employee representation can have an impact on the choice 
of the projects by the board and that a board that would have invested in a short-term project 
without employee representation may invest in a long-term project when employees hold some 
seats on the board. One empirical prediction is therefore that firms with employee representatives 
on their board should invest more in long-term assets, which is consistent with what the Gallois 
report predicts. This result is due to the fact that employee representatives have an incentive in 
investing in a long-term project that may reduce the risk for employees of being laid-off while 
they have little interest in maximizing the shareholder value if they do not hold shares 
themselves. 
Such a change in the firm strategy always benefit the employees and may also be beneficial to 
shareholders as well as to top executives even if their interests are conflicting with these of the 
workers, particularly if employees can add valuable information to long-term investment projects. 
However, it can also be detrimental to shareholders and top executives, if the cost of employee 
representation exceeds its benefits, or if the value of the short-term strategy for shareholders or 
top executives is much larger than the value of the long-term strategy. Thus, employee 
representation should be more beneficial to shareholders in sectors with long-term time horizon, 
such as the aeronautical, defense or pharmaceutical industries. 
Finally, the model predicts that employee representation can lower the agency costs because it 
may in some cases help align the interests of the top-executives with these of the shareholders. 
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While the concept of a “stakeholder society” appears somewhat utopian because its 
materialization would likely pose many new problems, as synthesized by Tirole (2006), the idea 
has spread in the public opinion and in the political debate that stakeholders other than 
shareholders should have their say in a firm decision-making process since they are impacted by 
its externalities. The French law on employee representation on the board of directors offers a 
good illustration of this increasing concern within the political sphere. First introduced in 1986, 
under a right-wing government with a view to “sweeten the pill” following a so-called 
privatization wave, employee representation has been largely strengthen in 2013 by a left wing-
government with the declared objective of improving the competitiveness of French firms by 
limiting the impact of investors’ and managers’ myopia12. This argument can be found in the 
2012 “Gallois report” named after renowned French businessman and former CEO of Airbus 
Louis Gallois, which, amongst various policy propositions to improve the competitiveness of 
France economy, suggests that employee representation be mandatory on the board of directors 
of large firms. The rationale behind this proposition is that employee representation would 
“counterbalance the weight of shareholders by favoring long-term players and giving voice to 
other stakeholders”. The fact that a large fraction of shareholders focus more on short-term 
returns is a commonly held view in Europe and is supported by empirical findings. Beyer et al. 
(2014) find that “Nearly all companies describe their ideal shareholder as having a long-term 
investment horizon but about half of companies’ shareholder base has a short-or medium-term 
horizon”. The authors distinguish different types of shareholders, as their time horizon may 
                                                          
12
 The Ordonnance n°86-1135 du 21 octobre 1986 required firms that had been privatized after 1986 have at least 
two employee representatives on their boards and allowed other firms to have employee representatives. In both 
case the number of employee representatives was limited to a third of the total number of seats. This upper limit 
was not changed by the loi n° 2013-504 du 14 juin 2013 relative à la sécurisation de l'emploi which made employee 
representation mandatory in firms with more than 5,000 employees domestic or 10,000 worldwide. 
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drastically differ. Typically, passive funds are viewed as long-term players while venture 
capitalists have very short-term time horizon, at least following an IPO, as shown by Cadman and 
Sunder (2014). In our model, we assume that shareholders, as well as the top management team, 
can either have a short- or a long-term time horizon while employees prefer long-term investment 
projects over short-term ones. While this last assumption may appear controversial, OECD
13
 
survey suggests that the job tenure of the majority of workers is greater than five years. Yet, as 
shown by Mannix and Loewenstein (1993), workers have a long-term time horizon, unless the 
turnover is high. The agreement signed on February 18
th
 2010 in the German metalworking and 
electrical industries is good illustration: workers union accepted a temporary a wage-freeze in 
exchange for jobs safeguard and a focus on training. 
To date, there are relatively few papers that relates directly to employee representation on the 
board of directors. However, the question to know whether it increases or decreases firm value is 
not a new one. As soon as 1979, Jensen and Meckling argued that the very absence of employee-
elected directors when they are not mandatory is the best evidence that employee representation 
is not in the interest of shareholders. 
Using a sample of the 250 largest publicly held German corporations, Gorton and Schmid (2004) 
show that firms with equal representation of shareholders and employees on the supervisory 
board have a market value by one third lower than firms where only one third of the seats of the 
supervisory board are occupied by employees. They argue that this may come from the fact that 
labor utility function is different from shareholders utility function. Using a larger sample, Fauver 
                                                          
13
 http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TENURE_DIS 
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and Fuerst (2006) find that prudent levels of employee representation improve firm value. They 
show that the optimal level of representation is under one half. 
An important argument in favor of employee representation, that can be found in Fauver and 
Fuerst, along with a very comprehensive literature review, is that there may be a prisoner’s 
dilemma: employee representation increases firm value if and only if it is mandatory for all firms, 
so that the best CEOs do not flee from firms that allow employees to elect directors. They also 
argue that employee representation may enhance exchange of information between employees 
and insiders and thus reduce coordination costs (Freeman and Lazear, 1995). As suggested by 
Fauver and Fuerst, we will assume that shareholders are reluctant to have employee 
representation and that the number of employee-elected directors is an exogenous parameter, 
determined by law requirements. 
Another argument, given by Prigge (1998), is that employee representatives may hold specific 
private information, be tougher monitors and therefore help reduce agency cost. Moreover, the 
fact that some large firms, such as Google, have set up internal predictive markets to gather 
information held by employees shows that managers value workers’ “wisdom”.  Megginson et al. 
(2011) using a sample of large publicly traded French firms from the SBF 120 give consistence to 
this argument, since they find that employee representation increases the amount of dividend paid 
to shareholders, which they interpret as a mitigation of agency costs. 
Faleye et al. (2006) show that labor-controlled firms invest less in long-term assets. Also our 
model suggests otherwise, they study labor equity ownership while the employee directors in our 
model are elected by their peers as employee representatives. They also find that labor-controlled 
firms take lower risk, a point with which our model is consistent. 
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model and then we study the 
impact of employee representation in two cases: in section 3 we assume that there is no conflict 
of interest between board members and in section 4 we assume that there is a conflict of interest 
between employees and either or both of shareholders and top executives. We detail the empirical 
predictions and policy implications of the model in section 5 before concluding in section 6. 
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1.2. The Model 
 
We study a board composed of three types of directors – outsiders, insiders and employee 
representatives – who face an investment decision. 
1.2.1. The investment decision 
The board must choose to invest in one of two possible projects: 
A long-term risk-free project P1 which brings a revenue 1R  at the end of the period with a 
probability of success equal to 1, 
A short-term risky project P2 which brings a revenue 2R  at the beginning of the period with a 
probability p  or nothing with probability  1 p 14. 
We assume that both projects require the same initial investment at the beginning at the period. 
We therefore normalized this investment to 0. 
As seen in Beyer et al. (2014), a focus on the short-term is often accused of endangering the 
future of the firm by preventing the decision-makers to make long-term strategic choices of 
investment. This, referred to as “investor myopia”, seems to indicate that investments in order to 
yield a short-term return are riskier than long-term investments, as is the case for stock holding
15
. 
Thus, we assume the short-term project to be riskier than the long-term one – which, for 
simplicity, is risk-free. 
                                                          
14
 This implies that the value of P1 must be discounted in order to be compared to the expected value of P2. 
15
 http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/invmgmt/ch3/timerisk.htm 
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We assume that the revenue of either of the projects depends exclusively on the board 
composition
16
. Formally, the revenue of the project P1 is such as: 
 1
1 1 1
ins out er
ins out er ins out er
ins out er
N N N
R N N N
N N N
            
    
And the revenue of the project P2 is such as: 
 2 1
1 1 1
ins out er
ins out ins out er er
ins out er
N N N
R N N N R
N N N
             
    
where 0ins   is the private information of insiders, 0out   is the private information of outsiders 
and 0er   is the private information of employee representatives 0   is the coordination cost 
between the directors
17
. We assume that insiders, because of their position, have access to the 
most valuable information. Then, 
 ; ;ins out er insMax      
We do not make any assumption on the value of out  relative to the value of er . The fact that 
employees may hold valuable information for the board is not only present in the literature, as in 
Prigge (1998), but was also pointed out in discussions with directors
18
, and is the main reason 
why some large firms, including Google, use internal prediction markets.  Precisely, employees 
hold specific information on the business situation and should be able to efficiently drive 
investment or reduce costs. We assume that amongst each type of players there is some shared 
information – that is information that is held by all or some players of a type – and individual 
                                                          
16
 Or, put it another way, we only study the fraction of the revenue that depends on the board composition. 
17
 This is similar to the feature used by Raheja (2006). Alternatively, this cost can be interpreted as the directors’ 
fees. 
18
 In particular with people from the Institut Français des Administrateurs – the French Institute of Directors – 
including Alain Martel. 
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information – specific to one player. This is why the revenue function is designed such as adding 
a director of a type is becoming less and less interesting as the number of directors of this type 
grows. 
The revenues from P1 and P2 differ because we assume that employee representatives refuse to 
cooperate when the board choose to invest in the short-term project that is detrimental to them, as 
we see in the section 1.4. While we assume that only employee representatives can withhold 
information, insiders may still misbehave by supporting the project that does not maximize the 
shareholder value. In a sense we assume that employee have a greater “misbehavior margin” than 
insiders. This assumption comes from the fact that employee representatives generally enjoy a 
better job protection than insiders. Under the French law for instance, it is virtually impossible to 
lay-off an employee representative – so as to prevent employees’ rights violations, while 
removing a top executive is much easier. Therefore, we assume that insiders can only partially 
misbehave and cannot frontally oppose the board by withholding their information. Another 
possible justification would consist in arguing that employees can extract and share more 
valuable information for their preferred project. 
For simplicity, we assume the coordination costs to be linear – since we model the value added 
by each type of directors as a concave function, the effect of having a convex cost would be very 
limited. The reason why there is an employee coordination cost even when they do not cooperate 
can be explained by the fact that they may oppose the other board members, reducing the 
efficiency of the board meetings. 
In the absence of employee representation both projects bring the same revenue R  with 
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  2 1
1 1 1
ins out er
ins out ins out er er er
ins out er
N N N
R N N R N R N
N N N
                   
  
 
1.2.2. The board composition 
We assume that the interests of outsiders are perfectly aligned with these of the shareholders who 
elect them, and therefore act accordingly to maximize the shareholder value. The number of 
outsiders on the board is outN  and they discount the future at a factor  0;1out 
19
 per period. The 
Gallois report states that shareholders and top-executive try to obtain short-term returns at the 
expense of the long-term interest of the firm and its employees. This suggests that different types 
of agents may discount future cash-flows at different rates, and in particular that the discount rate 
used by shareholders and top executives is higher than this used by employees. We differ from 
the Gallois report in that we do not believe that shareholders and insiders necessarily use a high 
discount rate but agree that they may have different time horizon and therefore assume different 
discount factors between the different agents.  
Insiders are members of the top management team. They have an interest in term of reputational 
capital to maximize the value of the board decision, but since their discount factor may be 
different from this of outsiders, they may misbehave – that is vote for a project that does not 
maximize the shareholder value – if not properly incentivized. We  assume for simplicity that 
incentives can only be given to all insiders. The number of insiders on the board is insN  and their 
discount factor is  0;1ins  . 
                                                          
19
 Note that all parameters  are of the form 
1
1 r
where r is the discount rate for the period. We use the discount 
factor for simplicity. 
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Employee representatives are elected by their peers accordingly to the law to represent them and 
defend their interests. We assume that employees, unlike insiders, have no interest in maximizing 
the firm value because they are not shareholders and the reputational capital would be negligible 
for them. Importantly, we assume that employee representatives always act in the employees’ 
best interest, even if having a seat on the board may alter their utility function
20
. This implies that 
employee representatives cannot be “bought” by shareholders or by the management; they cannot 
be incentivized to act against the employees’ interests. The number of employee-representatives 
on the board is erN  and their discount factor is  0;1er  .
21
 
We do not make any assumptions on the values of the different discount factors but study what 
happens in different cases – formally we distinguish in section 3 and 4 the cases where out and 
ins are larger or lower than the probability of success p  of the project P2. Note that we do not 
need to make an assumption on the value of er  
for the employees to always prefer the long-term 
project, because we assume in the next section that the cost they incur when P2 fails is high 
enough that they always prefer P1. However, as stated in the introduction, the fact that employee 
job tenure seems to be superior to five years for most of them, combined to the time horizon 
experimental study by Mannix and Loewenstein (1993) would suggest that employees have a 
preference for long-term, safer investments. Beyer et al. (2014) show that management believe 
they have a shorter time horizon than their shareholder base. In terms of discount factor, this 
                                                          
20
 For instance, under the French law, employee representatives benefit from exclusive employment-protection 
rights. 
21
 The main results of the paper would hold with out ins er    . The only result that would not is the fact that 
employee representation may alter – mitigate or aggravate – the conflict of interest between shareholders and top 
executives, because in our model, interest of shareholders and top executives are aligned when out ins 
However, this particular result could be found by introducing another form of conflict of interest – such as a private 
benefit for top executives on one or the other of the projects. 
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would suggest that ins out  . We however study both cases when this inequality is satisfied and 
when it is not. 
We assume that the board composition is decided by shareholders before the choice of the 
project. 
1.2.3. Directors’ preferences 
We assume that all directors of a same type – outsiders, insiders or employees – act accordingly 
to their type and vote for their group preferred project. The decision is taken on the simple 
majority rule. In case of equality, the chairman takes the decision and, the chairman is always an 
outsider
22
. 
Outsiders and insiders preferred project depends on the factor at which they discount future cash-
flows. Since outsiders act in the shareholders best interest, they want to maximize the firm value, 
which means that, in the absence of employee representation, they have a preference for the long-
term project if and only if: 
out outR p R p       
We assume that insiders enjoy a reputational benefit relative to the firm value, that we model by a 
share 0b   of the firm value. Therefore, in the absence of employee representation they have a 
preference for the long-term project if and only if: 
ins insb R b p R p         
                                                          
22
 We make this assumption for the sake of simplicity only as it does not change the signification of the different 
outcomes. 
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We therefore define the preference for the long (short) term as the value of the discount factor for 
the long-term project relative to the risk of the short-term project in the absence of employee 
representation.
 
We assume that employee representatives always prefer the long-term project because 1/ 
employees have generally no claim on the firm’s benefit once their wages are paid, and 2/ while 
both projects bring the same revenue, one of them is riskier than the other. We assume that in 
case of failure of P2, employees incur a loss erC  capturing the fact that bad firm performance in 
the studied period can result in lay-offs or wage cuts at a later period. As we said, we assume that 
incentivizing employee representatives alone is not possible; we furthermore assume that it is too 
costly to incentivize employees to induce them to prefer the project P2. Formally: 
 
 
1
1
out
er
er
p R
C
p


 

 
 (see Appendix 1) 
In Chemla (2005) the threat of a takeover refrain stakeholders investment. We adopt a somehow 
similar view by assuming that employees only cooperate with the board if the long-term project is 
chosen, that is if they are given some sort of insurance that the management do not intend to 
destroy jobs. At some level, information sharing by the employee representatives can be seen as 
the employees’ investment in a project. This investment should be greater if there is less risk for 
them to be laid-off.  Note that we assume that financial distress costs are greater for employees 
than for shareholders and top executives. For simplicity we assume that financial distress costs 
equal 0 for outsiders and insiders. 
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Finally, insiders can be incentivized so as to induce them to vote for the shareholders’ preferred 
project. For simplicity, incentives are paid at the same time the project brings a revenue – that is 
at the beginning of the period for P2 and at the end of the period for P1. 
 
Finally, we assume that the discount factor used by shareholders is known from all players 
because it can be extracted from the rate of return they require. We also assume that all players 
also know that employee representatives always prefer the risk-free project P1 but that only the 
top executives know their own discount factor which they only reveal once asked what project 
they will support. 
 
The timing is thus as follows: 
1/ The shareholders elect a board with insN insiders, outN outsiders and employees elect erN of 
their peers according to the law 
2/ The shareholders learn the discount factor – preference – of the insiders 
3/ The shareholders decide whether or not to incentivize insiders 
4/ The board choose to invest in project P1 or P2 
5/ If chosen, P2 yields an immediate revenue with probability p. 
6/ At the end of the period, P1 yields, if chosen, a certain revenue. 
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1.3. Impact of employee representation in the absence of conflict of 
interest 
 
In the following section, we determine the optimal board composition in the absence of conflict 
of interest, that is, if all directors want to invest in the project P1. Note that since shareholders do 
not know if insiders will behave or not they may prefer not to elect the optimal number of 
insiders.  In the absence of conflict of interest, taking the derivative of 1R in erN  gives: 
 
 
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
0
1
0 1
er
er er
er
er er
er
er
er
dR
dN N
dR
dN N
dR
N
dN
 
 


  

   

   
  
Proposition 1:  in the absence of conflict of interest there is a cutoff miner   such as for all 
min
er er   it is always value maximizing to have at least one employee representative. 
This means that if shareholders, insiders and employee representatives all prefer the long-term 
project, it is always optimal for the shareholders to have a least one employee seating on the 
board as long as employees hold information with sufficient value. 
From the previous result, it is optimal for the shareholders to have at least one employee 
representative seating on the board if and only if: 
min1 1 4er er er

  

        
Similarly, we find that 
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 0 1insins
ins
dR
N
dN


     
 0 1outout
out
dR
N
dN


     
Hence, it is optimal for the shareholders to have at least one director of type i  seating on the 
board if and only if: 
 4i    
In particular, in the absence of conflict of interest, the optimal number of employee 
representatives is between 1 and one third of the total seats number – the requirements of the 
French law – if and only if   er is such as: 
  12
2
er ins out          (see Appendix 2) 
The revenue with this optimal composition is therefore: 
  *1 2 3ins out er ins out erR                   (see Appendix 3) 
Lemma 1: in the absence on conflict of interest, a board with a relative majority of insiders 
maximizes the shareholder value. 
Since we assume that 
ins out   we have 1 1
ins out
ins outN N
 
 
      
Since we assume that 
er out   we have 1 1
er out
er outN N
 
 
      
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In particular, this means that in the absence of conflict of interest, a majority of employee 
representatives, as required by the German law in largest firms, is never optimal
23
. 
In the absence of employee representation it means that leaving the control of the board to 
insiders is value maximizing for shareholders in the absence of conflict of interest. It can also be 
the case even in the presence of conflict of interest as in Adams & Ferreira [2007]. 
 
Lemma 2: employee representation may reduce the conflict of interest between employees and 
shareholders as well as between employees and insiders. 
Since the presence of employee representatives alters the revenues of P1 and P2, it is possible 
that a conflict of interest between them and outsiders and or between them and insiders vanish 
when they hold seats on the board. 
Formally, it is possible that the two following inequalities be true: 
out p   
1 2out R p R     
This means that while shareholders are better off with project 2 in the absence of employee 
representation, project 1 maximizes the shareholder value when employee representatives hold 
board seats. 
Because 1 2 2 2
1
er
out out er
er
N
R p R R p R
N
  
 
         
 
 the higher the value of the 
information held by employee representatives, the more likely the inequality to be verified. 
The same relation holds for insiders if 
ins p    and 1 2ins R p R    . 
                                                          
23
 However, since we do not modelize monitoring, this may not stand, in particular in a dual board system.  
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We can also remark that employee representation can align the interests of shareholders and 
insiders if these where conflicting in the absence of employee representation. Formally, when 
out p    and  1 2out R p R     and  ins p   or when out p   and ins p    and  1 2ins R p R    . 
This is consistent with Ginglinger et al. (2011) who found that employee representation reduces 
the agency costs. The adverse effect here is that employee representation can also create conflict 
of interest if both outsiders and insiders would have had a preference for the short-term project in 
the absence of employee representation but that one of the two groups do not anymore with 
employee representation. 
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1.4. Impact of employee representation with conflict of interest 
 
Proposition 2: A board with employee representatives invests in the long-term project P1 while 
it would have invested in the short-term project P2 without them when max min
out out out    . The 
cutoffs  max
out  and 
min
out   take different values depending on the values of out   and ins   
relative to p . 
This means that employee representation may, as predicted by the Gallois report, alter the board 
choice, making it switch from short-term to long-term strategy. This can happen when the 
difference in terms of shareholder value between the short-term and the long-term strategies is 
not too large. Indeed, if the short-term project maximizes by large the shareholder value, it is 
unlikely that the value added by employee representatives to the long-term project be large 
enough to modify shareholders’ preference. 
We distinguish and study three cases here to determine the different values taken by the cutoffs:  
1/ shareholders would have preferred the long-term project in the absence of employee 
representation but insiders would have preferred the short term project. Formally, out p   and  
ins p  . 
2/ shareholders would have preferred the short-term project in the absence of employee 
representation but insiders would have preferred the long term project. Formally, out p   and 
ins p  . 
3/ shareholders and insiders would have preferred the short-term project in the absence of 
employee representation. Formally, out p    and  ins p  . 
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Note that if both shareholders and insiders would have preferred the long-term project in the 
absence of employee representation, the presence of employee representatives has no impact on 
the choice of the project although it does have an impact on the project value. 
Indeed, since 
1
2
1
er
er er
er
er
N
R R N
N
R R N
 


    

   
 
Then, 
1 2
1 2
out out
ins ins
R p R R p R
b R b p R b R b p R
 
 
      
 
          
 
1/ For the proposition to hold in the first case, that is with out p   and ins p   a board with no 
employee representatives must choose the project P2 while a board with a number 1erN   of 
employee representatives must choose the project P1. 
In the absence of employee representatives, that is 0erN  , the board choose the project P2 if 
outsiders are a minority and incentivizing insiders to induce them to pick P1 is too costly. 
To induce the insiders to behave, shareholders must give each of them a share ins of the revenue 
of P1 such as: 
 
min
ins ins
ins
ins ins
ins
b R b p R
p
b
 

 

     

   
 
min
ins  is the minimum share of revenue that must be given to insiders for them to behave. 
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Incentivizing the insiders does not maximize the shareholder value if shareholders are better off 
letting them misbehave and choose P2 that is if and only if: 
 
max
1 insout ins
ins
ins
out out
ins ins ins
p
R N b p R
p
N b p




 
 
 
       
 
   
   
 
When there are employee representatives on the board, that is 1erN  , the board always choose 
P1 if the insiders are a minority, that is if er out insN N N  , in which case 
min 0out   . Otherwise, 
when insiders control the board, the firm invests in P1 if and only if shareholders find it value 
maximizing to incentivize insiders. 
In order to behave, each insider must be given a share ins of the revenue such as: 
  1 2
min 2 1
1
ins ins
ins
ins ins
ins
b R b p R
p R R
b
R
 

 

     
  
   

 
Incentivizing the insiders to behave maximizes the shareholder value if and only if: 
 
2 1
1 2
1
min 2
1 2
1
1
ins
out ins
ins
ins
out out
ins ins ins
p R R
R N b p R
R
R
p
R N b N b p R




 

   
       
 
   
       
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Thus, proposition 2 holds in this case for 
 
max ins
out out
ins ins ins
p
N b p

 
 
 
   
 and 
 
min 2
1 21
ins
out out
ins ins ins
p R
R N b N b p R

 

  
       
 if insiders are a majority or min min 0out out   
if they are not. 
 
2/ For the proposition to hold in the second case, that is with out p   and ins p   a board with no 
employee representatives must choose the project P2 while a board with a number 1erN   of 
employee representatives must choose the project P1. 
In the absence of employee representatives, the board controlled by outsiders will always choose 
P2, in which case maxout out    is always satisfied – that is to say that 
max
out   equals 1. Otherwise, 
a board controlled by insiders will invest in P2 only if shareholders are better off incentivizing 
insiders. 
Insiders behave if given each a share ins of the revenue such as: 
 
min
ins ins
ins
ins ins
b p R b R
p
b
p
 

 
     
   
 
Hence, incentivizing the insiders maximizes the shareholder value if and only if: 
 max
1 insins out
out out ins ins
p
p R N b R
p
p N b p


  
 
       
 
      
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When there are employee representatives on the board, the firms invest in P1 in two cases: 
- if insiders and employee representatives are a majority but outsiders are better off not 
giving incentives to insiders 
- if outsiders control the board but find it more profitable to invest in P1 than in P2 – 
because the presence of employee representatives changes the revenues of P1 and P2. 
In order to induce insiders to behave, shareholders must give each of them a share ins of the 
revenue such as: 
  2 1
min 1 2
2
ins ins
ins
ins ins
b p R b R
R p R
b
p R
 

 
     
     

 
Incentivizing the insiders does not maximize the shareholder value if and only if: 
1 2
2 1
2
1 22
1 2
1
1
ins
ins out
ins
out ins
R p R
p R N b R
p R
R p RR
p N b
R p R




   
       
 
   
       
 
 
Outsiders find it more profitable to vote for P1 if and only if: 
2 1
2
1
out
out
p R R
R
p
R


  
  
 
Therefore, since, 
 2 2
1 1
1 ins ins ins
R R
p p N b N b
R R
          
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the value for the cutoff is min 2
1
out
R
p
R
    . 
Thus, proposition 2 holds in this case for min min 2
1
out out
R
p
R
      and 
 max maxout out ins insp N b p        . 
3/ For the proposition to hold in the third case, that is with out p   and ins p   a board with no 
employee representatives must choose the project P2 while a board with a number 1erN   of 
employee representatives must choose the project P1. 
In this case, since out p   and ins p   a board without employee representatives always pick the 
project P2 because it maximizes the value for both the shareholders and the insiders. 
In the presence of employee representatives, the board choose the project P1 if one of the 
following is true: 
- P1 maximizes the shareholder value and insiders are a minority 
- P1 maximizes both the shareholder and insider value 
- P1 maximizes the shareholder value and insiders are majority but shareholders are better 
off incentivizing them 
- P1 maximizes the insider value and shareholders are better off not incentivizing them 
P1 maximizes the shareholder value if and only if: 
2 1
min 2
1
out
out out
p R R
R
p
R

 
  
   
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P1 maximizes the insider value if and only if: 
2 1
min 2
1
ins
ins ins
b p R b R
R
p
R

 
    
   
 
Shareholders are better off incentivizing insiders if and only if: 
 
2 1
1 2
1
min 2
1 2
1
1
ins
out ins
ins
ins
out out
ins ins ins
p R R
R N b p R
R
p R
R N b N b p R




 

   
       
 
   
       
  (from Case 1/) 
Then the binding constraint for proposition 2 to holds in this case is: 
min min minmax ;out out out out   
    
 
 
Finally the values of the cutoff for proposition 2 to hold in any case are: 
 
min min min 2 2
1 2 1
max ; max ;
1
ins
out out out
ins ins ins
p R R
p
R N b N b p R R

  

                  
 
 
 max max maxmin ; min ;insout out out ins ins
ins ins ins
p p N b p
N b p

   
 
 
                
 
Unsurprisingly, since 
1 2
1
er
er
er
N
R R
N
  

, the higher the value of the information held by the 
employees the lower the minimal cutoff. 
The higher the probability of success of the project 2, the higher the minimal and maximal 
cutoffs. 
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Proposition 3: There is a cutoff out such as for all out out  and
max min
out out out     the 
presence of employee representatives always maximizes the shareholder value. 
This means that when the presence of employee representatives has an impact on the board 
strategy, it also maximizes the shareholder value if shareholders use a large enough discount 
factor. 
To determine the cutoff out , we use the same the same three cases as in proposition 2. 
1/ In the first case out p  , and 
   
min max 2
1 2
; ;
1
ins ins
out out
ins ins ins ins ins ins
p R
p
R N b N b p R N b p
 
 
  
                      
  
The employee representation that switches the board choice from project 2 to project 1 
maximizes the shareholder value if one of the followings in verified: 
- er out insN N N  and 1out R p R     
- ins er outN N N  and 1 1
ins
out ins
p
R p R N b
p


 
       
 
 
Therefore, the binding constraint is 1
1
out out out
R
R p R p
R
           
In particular, since we know that out p  and that 1
1
er
er er
er
N
R R N
N
     

the constraint is 
always met when the benefit of employee representation exceed its cost, that is when 
1
er
er er
er
N
N
N
   

. 
 99  
 
2/ In the second case out p  and  min max 2
1
; ;out out ins ins
R
p p N b p
R
  
             
  
The board choose the project 1 in the presence of employee representatives if outsiders are a 
minority and incentivizing insiders is too costly. Hence, employee representation maximizes the 
shareholder value if and only if 
1
1 22
1 1 2
1
1
ins
out ins
ins
out out out ins
p
R p R N b
p
R p RRR
p p N b
R R p R



  
 
       
 
               
 
 
3/ In the third case out p   and the constraint for the board to board to switch from the short-term 
to the long-term project is 
 
min 2 2
1 2 1
max ;
1
ins
out
ins ins ins
p R R
p
R N b N b p R R



  
  
         
  
The presence of employee representatives maximizes the shareholder value if: 
- er out insN N N  and 1out R p R     
- ins er outN N N  and 
2 1
1
1
1 insout ins
ins
p R R
R N b p R
R



   
       
 
 
The latter is the binding constraint; hence proposition 3 holds in this case for: 
 1 21
ins
out out
ins ins ins
p R
R N b N b p R

 

  
       
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Finally, 
 1 1 1 2
max ; ; max ; 1 ;
1
ins ins
out out out out ins
ins ins ins
p p RR R
p p N b
R R p R N b N b p R
 
   

                             
 
Since 
out out 
  , this simplifies to 
 1 1 2
max ;
1
ins
out
ins ins ins
p RR
p
R R N b N b p R



  
  
         
 
Thus, employee representation not only may impact the choice of the project by the board, but it 
also can be done in the shareholders best interest. It is also obviously always in the employees 
interest since we assume that the short-term project P2 always costs them more than the long-
term project P1. 
As for insiders, they always benefit from employee representation if: 
1
1
ins
ins
b R b p R
R
p
R


    
  
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1.5. Policy implications and empirical predictions 
 
Our model provides several empirical predictions regarding the impact of employee 
representation. In this section we detail these predictions before discussing their policy 
implications. 
We show that even if employees hold only a minority of the board seats, they can influence the 
board decisions, and in particular make the firm shift from short-to long-term investments, as 
argued in the Gallois report. Thus, firms with employee representatives on their board should 
invest more in long-term assets than firms with no employee representation. This does not 
contradicts Faleye, Mehrotra and Morck (2006) who find that labor-controlled firms invest less in 
long-term assets because we assume in our model that employees are not shareholders. In sectors 
already investing a lot in long-term projects, such as aeronautical, defense or pharmaceutical 
industries, employee representation should have a stronger positive impact on shareholder value 
that in other sectors, because of the relative convergence of interest between shareholders and 
employees. However, the model predicts that it will only be the case for firms whose 
shareholders have a relatively long-term time horizon – passive funds rather than hedge funds. 
We also show that employee representatives can provide the board with valuable information, 
thus possibly reducing the extent of the conflict of interest between them and shareholders as well 
as between shareholders and managers. Hence, firms in which employee representation has an 
impact on the time-horizon of investments, should have a higher market value than firm without 
employee representation and lower agency costs which should lead higher payouts to 
shareholders. This is consistent with Fauver and Fuerst (2006) who find that a limited employee 
representation increases significantly the value of large German firms as well as with Ginglinger, 
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et al. (2011) who find that dividends are higher in companies with employee representatives on 
the board, what they interpret as a reduction of the agency costs. The opposite effects – lower 
market value and higher agency costs – should be observed in firms whose shareholders have a 
shorter time horizon. 
Finally, employee representation may have an impact on the shareholder structure of firms, 
driving away investors with the shortest time horizons. 
Our model thus offers support for a mandatory employee representation. If the objective pursued 
by the policy-maker is either to give a real power to employees in firms’ decision-making, or to 
induce firms to invest in long-term projects rather than in short-term risky ones, it can be 
achieved by making employee representation on the board directors a requirement. Depending on 
the time horizon of the shareholders base and management of the targeted firms, such a policy 
may hurt or benefit the shareholders. Regardless of the impact on shareholders wealth, employee 
representation may be optimal if we take into account the impact on other stakeholders. 
However, because employee representation may discourage investors looking for short-term 
returns, the policy-maker may want to refrain to extend it to firms with high growth prospects, or 
to firms which typically attract short-term investors such as venture capitalist.  
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1.6. Conclusion 
 
While the shareholder value theory is increasingly challenged both inside and outside the 
academic world, more attention is paid to the role of other stakeholders. We study the impact of 
employee representation on the board of directors. Employees are stakeholders who hold valuable 
information but whose interest and time horizon may differ from these of shareholders and 
managers. We show that a minority of employee representatives on the board can impact the 
strategic choices made by the firm, and cause lead to more investment in long-term projects. We 
show that employee representation increases the shareholder value if the conflict of interest is not 
too severe and employees can provide valuable enough information. 
Employee representation is always beneficial to employees and can also be to shareholders and 
managers if they have relatively long time horizons. For the firms where employee representation 
is detrimental to shareholders, it may still be beneficial to a stakeholder society – including the 
state, communities, commercial contractors, etc. 
Thus, mandating employee representation on the board of directors appears as an attractive policy 
since it could have a globally positive impact on stakeholders’ wealth. In particular, it should 
increase the shareholder value as long as the policy is restricted to large, mature firms whose 
shareholders have a relatively long time horizon. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Condition under which incentivizing employees is too costly 
for shareholders 
 
In order to behave – pick P2 over P1 – employees could be given a share   of the expected 
revenue of P2, such as: 
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The minimal level for incentives is thus  
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It is not in the shareholders interest to give them this incentive if and only if: 
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Appendix 2: Optimal number of employee representation is between 1 and 
one third of the number of seats 
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Appendix 3: Revenue with the optimal board composition in the absence of 
conflict of interest 
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Abstract 
 
A number of papers have investigated the implications of political connections. Empirical results 
strongly suggest that there are benefits for a company to be tied with a politician. In particular, it 
has been showed that politically connected firms enjoy better conditions on bank loans. We 
introduce a more accurate definition of political connection. Because politicians with business 
ties can be suspected of collusion or ethic breach, which can cost them dearly, we distinguish 
between connections with a top profile, more exposed, politician and connections with a 
politician at a lesser level. We conduct a cross-country study that shows the importance of 
making such a discrimination. We find that politically connected firms borrow at a significantly 
discounted interest rate if 1/ the borrowing company is tied to a lower level politician and 2/ the 
bank is politically connected. The effect is stronger if the bank also is tied to a less exposed 
politician. Furthermore, our results suggest that politically connected firms try to minimize the 
probability of their links being exposed as they avoid borrowing from banks tied to top 
politicians, particularly during political campaigns.  
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3.1. Introduction 
 
Politically connected firms have been widely studied over the past 20 years. A number of 
empirical studies have shown various effects of these connections. The impact of political 
connections on corporate debt have been particularly thoroughly studied, with studies proving 
that politically connected firms enjoy various benefits  such as access to a greater credit 
availability, or a higher probability to be bailed out in case of financial distress. Some studies also 
suggest that these advantages do not come for free and that politically connected firms help 
politicians get (re)elected more than non-connected one do. 
 
But the number of scandals of bribery involving politicians – such as the very famous cases of 
former Peru President Fujimori or former Italy Prime Minister Berlusconi who were both 
convicted, one for bribery, the other for tax fraud – have also shown  that, for politicians, having 
business ties may be risky. Obviously, there is the risk of being charged and convicted, for one 
involved in illegal activities, but there is also a risk in terms of reputation and career concerns. In 
2014, a French Secretary of State had to resigned when it was made public than relatives of his 
were being investigated for being awarded public contracts. He was not being prosecuted at the 
time – and still has not been yet – but resigned nonetheless. Thus, it appears that being tied to a 
company is risky for a politician, whether or not this leads him to some form or misconduct. In 
this case, one could then expect politicians to be particularly careful when they have such ties, 
particularly if they enjoy a large media exposure.  
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Based upon the definition given by Faccio (2006) in her seminal paper, we introduce a new 
dimension to political connection, by subcategorizing politically connected firms into firms 
connected with a high profile politician and firms connected with people close to power but in a 
less visible role. In some sense, we make the hypothesis that while a congressmen need to be very 
careful to avoid being suspected – of ethic breach or worse – his less-exposed chief of staff have 
more latitude to do as he pleases. We conduct a cross-country study of the impact of political 
connection on the interest rate of bank loans, taking into account the visibility variable we 
introduce. 
We find significant evidence that discriminating matters. While Infante and Piazza (2014) show 
that the bank connection level – local, regional, national – influences the rate of the loan they 
offer to politically connected borrowers, we show that there is also a strong effect linked to the 
visibility of the politician a borrower is connected to. 
 
Indeed, using the traditional non-discriminating definition of political connection we show that 
politically connected firms borrow money from banks at a significantly lower interest rate. Using 
definitions which distinguish between highly visible and less visible connections, we show that 
politically connected firms borrow money from banks at a significantly lower interest rate only if 
1/ their connection is a less visible one and 2/ the lender is also politically connected.  
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Finally, we show that politically connected firms borrow less frequently from lenders with a 
highly visible connection, and that this effect appears to be particularly strong during political 
campaign prior to an election. 
 
Overall, we provide evidence that the impact of political connections on bank loans strongly 
differ based on the visibility of the connection of the borrower as well as of the banker.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a literature review of politically connected 
firms. Section 3 describes the methodology, data and model. Section 4 details the results we find. 
Section 5 gives an extension of the study to account for the effect of elections. Finally, we sum-
up and discuss the results in section 6. 
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3.2. Litterature review 
 
Political connections have already received a large attention, particularly since Faccio (2006) 
seminal paper on politically connected firms. Even before, in one of the first academic papers to 
investigate the question of the relation between politicians and firms, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
build a model showing how politicians can benefit from their ties with companies while it could 
also add value to companies. 
 
While political connections may impact a company’s value in many ways, their impact on debt – 
availability, price, leverage… – has been one of the most studied topics.  
 
What is a politically connected firm? Faccio (2006) gives an excellent definition of political 
connection: a firm is politically connected when one of its directors, top executives or large 
shareholders is a current or former member of the parliament, member of the government, head 
of state or top official. The firm is also considered politically connected if one of its prominent 
members is closely related – being a close relative or a close friend – to one of the 
aforementioned persons. In this paper, we use a definition derived from Faccio’s – excluding 
shareholders, relatives and friends – and we also propose and test a new definition, based on the 
idea that some connections might be as strong – or stronger – while less visible. We assume that 
the media exposure of top politicians such as member of the parliament or of the government, not 
to mention the head of state, may limit their room for maneuver because politicians try to avoid 
being publicly accused or suspected of having conflicting interest. Multiple scandals over the past 
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few years give support to his assumption. For instance, in November 2014, French State secretary 
for war veterans resigned from office after it was revealed that a company managed by his 
relatives received public contracts from the Midi-Pyrénées region whose head belonged to the 
same political party as the State secretary. Thus, companies might gain more advantages from a 
connection with someone close to power – even though he might not formally hold any – but has 
a less visible role, such as a chief of staff. 
 
One of the main advantages for firms to be politically connected seems to be that it increases the 
availability of credit. Regarding performance, the results are a bit more controversial, although a 
majority of studies seem to suggest an increase in performance. 
 
Faccio (2006) finds that politically connected firms have higher leverage than others, as well as a 
worse performance (based on accounting measure). She also finds that a political connection 
increases the likelihood for a distressed firm to be bailed out. This could explain why politically 
connected firms are able to borrow more money, at a cheaper rate and therefore have a higher 
leverage.  
This is consistent with Khwaja and Mian (2005) who find that politically connected firms in 
Pakistan enjoy higher credit availability than their non-connected pairs. They also find the default 
rate to be more important for politically connected firms.  Similarly, Charumilind et al. (2006) 
find that Thai firms with a connection to banks or to politicians have easier access to long-term 
loans, are required less collateral and rely more on long-term loans. 
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Johnson and Mitton (2003) establish a positive link between the value of politically connected 
Malaysian firms and the ability of the government to provide subsidies. Other politically related 
advantages of political connections include a greater number of procurement contracts as shown 
by Goldman et al. (2013) and a protection against regulator enforcement action as well as lower 
penalties, as shown by Correia (2014). Blau et al. (2013) show that, following the 2008 financial 
crisis, politically connected firms or firms that lobbied were more likely to receive TARP funds, 
and in greater amount. 
Boubakri et al. (2012) confirm the link between political connection and easier access to credit. 
Moreover, they find that once politically connected, firms take higher risk and enjoy better 
performance 
Sapienza (2004) find that state-owned banks charge lower interest rates, particularly when they 
are in a strong electoral position. 
 
Infante and Piazza (2014) conduct a study that offers some similarities with our. They find that 
politically connected firms in Italy enjoy lower interest rates on bank loans when borrowing to a 
bank connected at the local level. However, we differ significantly in the scope of the study and 
the definitions we use. Rather than the “geographical level” – local, regional, national – 
connection of the lender, we distinguish between highest profile politicians – members of the 
parliament, of the government or heads of state – and politicians who stay in the shadows – chiefs 
of staff, ambassadors… - while still having a national influence. 
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Goldman et al. (2009) find a positive abnormal stock return on the announcement of the 
nomination of a politically connected directors as well as an increase (decrease) in the firm value 
when connected to Republicans (Democrats) after the election of a Republican president in 2000. 
In the same vein, Akey (2013) finds it rewarding for firms, in term of equity value, to contribute 
to political campaigns, and the reward is greater when betting on the winner. 
Ferguson and Voth (2008) find similarly that firms who supported the Nazi party in Germany 
outperformed their competitors after Hitler had risen to power. Cooper and al. (2009) find that 
firms who contribute to political campaign in the US experienced higher stock return, an effect 
stronger for Democrats and House candidates. However, Fisman et al (2012) find no effect on the 
market valuation of firms with personal ties to US Vice-President Cheney on various events - 
Cheney nomination, heart attacks, probability of election, the probability of a war… 
 
Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2007) find that business owners who have been elected 
to political office use their influence to increase the value of the firms they own. They also find 
that the business owners who rely the more on government concessions are, along with the 
wealthiest, the more likely to run for office. Their election is linked with a strong increase in their 
firms’ valuations. 
 
Boubakri, El Ghoul and Saffar (2013) find that politically connected firms hold more cash than 
others, which, since other studies show that they have less liquidity constraint, is interpreted by 
the authors either as a sign of weak governance or as a sign of a use by politicians of these firms 
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as cash cows. This last interpretation can be put in regard with Bertrand, Kramarz, Shoar and 
Thesmar (2007) who show that politically connected firms create more jobs and destroy fewer 
plants in swing states, particularly around election years. 
 
Related lending seems to have close effects to political connection but the results appears to be 
more controversial. 
 
La Porta et al. (2003) find related lending to be associated a lower interest rate, as well as higher 
rate of default and a lower recovery rate. Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that related lending is 
valuable in terms of credit availability but not in term of price. Dahiya et al. (2003) find that the 
negative market reaction on the announcement of a borrower financial distress situation is 
stronger for banks with a relationship with the borrower. 
However, Ferreira and Matos (2012) find that banks implied in a borrower’s corporate 
governance serve more often as lead arranger and charge higher rates, suggesting the existence of 
a form of looting to the benefit of the bank. 
Finally, Maurer and Haber (2003) argue that related lending does not need to lead to looting, but 
that it is a response to high information and contract enforcement costs. 
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3.3. Methodology and sample 
 
3.3.1. Data 
We obtain data on corporate loans from the DEALSCAN database. We only keep the facilities 
from a bank to a non financial corporation and only keep the facilities for which the lender is a 
lead or co-lead arranger or lender. We then only keep the facilities for which we could find ISIN 
numbers in order to gather accounting data. This reduces the sample to 1142 facilities out of the 
total 245221 provided by DEALSCAN. We extract accounting information on the borrower on 
the INFINANCIAL database and information – as well as biographies – on the composition on 
the board of directors and or of the managers for the lender and the borrower from the database 
REUTERS and BLOOMBERG BUSINESS. The size of sample was furthermore reduced to 572 
facilities as we needed three years of accounting data for each facility. We then determine the 
politically connected firms based on their current directors and executives biographies, and 
assumed political connections to remain constant through time. 
 
We also compiled the election dates of between 1979 and 2013 for the countries represented in 
our sample. We take into account the dates of legislative elections for all countries of the sample 
as well as the date of presidential elections only for countries in which the president hold 
significant power
24
 . 
 
                                                          
24
 These countries are Austria, Finland, France, Indonesia, Ireland, Mexico, Portugal, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan 
and the United States of America. 
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3.3.2. Determining political connections 
We use a modified version of Faccio’s definition as well as a new definition in an attempt to add 
a new dimension in the study of political connections that we call “exposure” or “visibility”. 
Faccio (2006) define a politically connected firm as one whose one of the top officers – directors 
or top executives – or large shareholders is a current or former head of state, member of the 
government or of the parliament, or is a close friend or relative to one of them. Except for the 
close friends or relatives, these people indeed hold power, but it is interesting to notice that they 
enjoy – or suffer from… – a high media exposure. Working for a company while also being a 
current or former high profile politician might however be risky.  
Because there have been multiple scandals of collusion and corruption of politicians by 
companies – the Whiskey Ring and the Crédit Mobilier scandals in the post Civil War United 
States, the Stavisky scandal in the 1930’s France, the Lockheed bribery scandal in Cold War 
Europe and United States are only some examples – these implied in a firm’s governance might 
be hampered in their ability to work for the firm as they may fear to be suspected of collusion. 
Importantly, breaching the law is not the same thing as being suspected of breaching it. The 
aforementioned French Secretary of state who had to resign when his ties to a public contractor 
company were made publicly known was not being charged at the time, and still has not. In other 
words, with power comes media exposure and with media exposure comes precaution, which 
here could translate into a lower ability to help a company obtaining advantages. 
Thus, we make the hypothesis that the impact of political ties on corporate debt – more 
particularly on credit rate – depends on the media exposure of the politicians the companies – 
borrower and lender – are linked to. In particular, politically connected borrowers should prefer 
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to borrow money either from non-connected lenders, or from lender with a low-visibility 
connection as the advantages in terms of loan price and credit availability would be more 
important. 
To test the hypothesis we use two different definitions of political connections: the first one aims 
at categorizing the firms that have a highly visible political connection – this means that they are 
connected through a politician with high media exposure – while the second one aims at 
categorizing the firms that have a lowly visible political connection. The first definition is derived 
from Faccio’s definition but we exclude from it the companies that are connected through a close 
relationship as we assumed this would not constitute a highly visible connection. For instance, if 
one of the directors of a company is a member of a government, the company has a highly visible 
connection. But if instead of being a member of the government himself the director is a friend or 
a nephew of a member of the government, we assume this would not qualify as a highly visible 
connection. In fact, we assume that such a connection may be or may not be highly visible and 
thus exclude such connections from both definitions. Because of the lack of data, we also exclude 
connection through a large shareholder. 
 
Definition 1 (type 1 connection): a company is politically connected if one of its directors or 
managers currently is or formerly was one of the followings: 
- head of state 
- member of the government 
- member of the parliament (including, in one case, of the European parliament). 
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Definition 2 (type 2 connection): a company is politically connected if one of its directors or 
managers is or formerly was one of the followings: 
-  ambassador 
- head of a region – such as a governor25 
- national official – people who work directly under a top official such as head of state or 
member of the parliament. Examples of people belonging to this category include chiefs of 
staffs and high level members of a staff/minister, head of a national agency. 
 
Definition 3: the firm is connected either through definition 1 or definition 2. 
 
Importantly, we classify as type 1 someone that we find to be both type 1 and type 2. For 
instance, a retired army general qualifies as type 2, but a retired army general who is also a 
former member of the parliament qualifies as type 1. Thus, if such a person seats on the board of 
directors of a company, the company is labeled as type 1. A company may be politically 
connected by a number of type 1 and type 2 links but can only be categorized as type-1-
connected or as type-2-connected. 
 
Infante and Piazza (2014) offer similarities in the discrimination of the definition, as well as close 
results. However, while they discriminate connected banks at different levels – local, regional… 
– we only account for national or top regional level connections for both borrowers and lenders 
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 Such as US 
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and distinguish between firms connection based on whether or not they are connected to a high or 
low profile politician. Importantly, almost all political connections in our sample are at a national 
level. Indeed, while definition 1 exclude all politicians but national level ones, definition 2 
include top regional level politicians such as state governors – though they account in fact for a 
very small number of our sample. The main difference between the two definitions is the level of 
media exposure of the politicians. 
 
3.3.3. Model and variables description 
We test the following regression: 
  4
5 6 7 8 9 10
11

i 1 2 i 3 i ii
i i i i i i
i 12 i 13
Spread = α+ β ×σ profitability + β × profitability + β × leverage + β × liquidity
+β ×assets β ×amount + β ×maturity + β × listed + β × related + β ×democracy_index
+β ×Strength(L2) + β ×Strength(B1) + β ×Strengt
20 21
i 14 i 15 i
16 i 17 i 18 i 19 i i i
h(B2) + β ×L1 + β ×L2
+β ×B1 + β ×B2 + β ×L1* B1 + β ×L1* B2 + β ×L2* B1 + β ×L2* B2
 
iSpread is the number of basis points added to the interest rate level to form the interest rate of 
facility i. 
 
i
σ profitability  is the volatility of the profitability of the borrower involved in facility i. It is 
calculated as the standard deviation of the ratio of the EBITDA over the value of total assets of 
the borrower over the three years prior to the facility start year. It proxies for the risk of the 
borrower. 
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iprofitability  is the sector-adjusted profitability of the borrower involved in facility i. It is 
calculated as the difference between the ratio of the EBITDA over the value of total assets of the 
borrower and the average ratio of the sector over the three years prior to the facility start year. 
ileverage  is the sector-adjusted leverage of the borrower involved in facility i. It is calculated as 
the difference between the ratio of the value of the long-term debt over the value of total assets of 
the borrower and the average ratio of the sector over the three years prior to the facility start year. 
iliquidity  is the sector-adjusted proxy for liquidity of the borrower involved in facility i. It is 
calculated as the difference between the ratio of the value of the cash & short-term investments 
over the value of total assets of the borrower and the average ratio of the sector over the three 
years prior to the facility start year. 
iassets  is the log of the total amount of assets of the borrower involved in facility i. 
iamount  is the logarithm of the amount in USD of facility i. 
imaturity  is the logarithm of the maturity expressed in months of facility i. 
ilisted  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the borrower involved in facility i is a listed company, and 
0 otherwise. 
irelated  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the borrower involved in facility i was previously 
involved in another facility with the same lender as in facility i. It proxies for the existence of a 
lending relationship between the borrower and the lender. 
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idemocracy_index  is the logarithm of the democracy index 2014 published by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, for the country of the borrower involved in facility i. We use it as a control for 
country fixed effects. 
iStrength(L2)  is either equal to the total number of links of type 2 of the lender involved in 
facility i minus 1, or to 0 if this number of links of type 2 is equal to 0. It proxies for the strength 
of the type 2 link of the lender
26
.  
iStrength(B1)  is either equal to the total number of links of type 1 of the borrower involved in 
facility i minus 1, or to 0 if this number of links of type 1 is equal to 0. It proxies for the strength 
of the type 1 link of the borrower. 
iStrength(B2)   is either equal to the total number of links of type 2 of the borrower involved in 
facility i minus 1, or to 0 if this number of links of type 2 is equal to 0. It proxies for the strength 
of the type 2 link of the borrower. Notice that iStrength(B1)  and iStrength(B2)  are not exclusive. 
iL1  is a dummy worth 1 if the lender involved in facility i is type-1-connected, and 0 otherwise. 
iL2  is a dummy worth 1 if the lender involved in facility i is type-2-connected, and 0 otherwise. 
Notice that iL1  and iL2  are exclusive.  
iB1  is a dummy worth 1 if the borrower involved in facility i is type-1-connected, and 0 
otherwise. 
iB2  is a dummy worth 1 if the borrower involved in facility i is type-2-connected, and 0 
otherwise. Notice that iB1   and iB2   are exclusive. 
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 No lender in the sample has more than one connection of type 1. Hence, iStrength(L1)  is always worth 0. 
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iL1* B1  is a dummy worth 1 if both the lender and borrower involved in facility i are type-1-
connected, and 0 otherwise. 
iL1* B2  is a dummy worth 1 if the lender involved in facility i is type-1-connected while the 
borrower is type-2-connected, and 0 otherwise. 
iL2* B1  is a dummy worth 1 if the lender involved in facility i is type-2-connected while the 
borrower is type-1-connected, and 0 otherwise. 
iL2* B2  is a dummy worth 1 if both the lender and borrower involved in facility i are type-2-
connected, and 0 otherwise. 
 
α  and 1β to 20β are the parameters of the model to be estimated. Figure 9 gives a visual 
description of the regression we test. 
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Figure 9: Testing the Determinants of the Interest Rate 
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3.3.4. Sample description 
 
Our sample includes 572 bank loans, involving 51 unique banks and 256 unique borrowers. Most 
firms come from North America, Europe, Japan or Southeast Asia. The borrower side of the 
sample is dominated by US firms which accounts for 39% of the number of borrowers, with 
Japanese firms accounting for 28% of it. Type-1-connected  lenders (borrowers) account for 12% 
(10%) of the total number of lenders (borrowers) which is a relatively high number compared to 
similar cross-country studies
27
 and politically connected firms might be overrepresented due to 
the greater availability of accounting data (see table 7 in appendix 4). Type-2-connected lenders 
(borrowers) account for 37% (27%) of the total number of lenders (borrowers) – this proportion 
not being comparable to any other studies. 
Consistent with this, type-2-connected lenders (borrowers) exhibit an average number of links 
equal to 1.17 (1.70), slightly higher than the average number of links of type-1-connected lenders 
(borrowers) which equals 1.00 (1.21) (see table 5 in appendix 2). 
 
Borrowers involved in deals with type-2-connected banks appears to be larger in size with a mean 
total assets close to $50millions against  $39millions for borrowers involved in deals with type-1-
connected banks. 
Borrowers that are connected through a type-2 link have total assets of much larger value with a 
mean of $88millions against $16millions for borrowers connected through a type 1 links. The 
difference is even larger for these involved in deals with politically connected lenders (see table 
                                                          
27
 Lower however than the 23% (37%) of connected firms (lenders) found by Khwaja and Mian (2005) 
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4a in appendix 1). The average amount of the loan to a type-2-connected borrower is also larger 
($1.6millions) than for type-1-connected borrowers ($1.2millions) (see table 4a in appendix 1). 
 
Contrary to what can be found in the literature we do not find strong structural differences 
between connected and non-connected borrowers. Unlike for instance Faccio (2006), we do not 
find politically connected borrowers to exhibit a worst – or better – accounting performance. 
Unlike Boubakri et al. (2013) we do find them to hold more cash or have higher leverage. Neither 
do we find them to have higher leverage. In fact, our results suggest that type-2-connected 
borrowers could even have a lower leverage (see table 4b in appendix 1 and table 8 in appendix 
5). 
 
3.3.5. Hypotheses 
H1a: The interest rate spread is lower for politically connected borrowers than for non-
connected borrowers. 
Although evidence from the literature is contrasted, we expect to find that being politically 
connected allow a company to borrow money at a lower rate. 
 
H1b: The interest rate spread is lower for type-2-connected borrowers than for type-1-connected 
borrowers connected. 
As we distinguish between the two types of connection based on the idea that people in a less 
exposed position are able to help a company more efficiently, we expect that firms with such 
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connections would have access to cheaper loans than firms connected with a high profile 
politician. 
 
H1c: The interest rate spread is lower for borrowers with stronger political connections. 
We expect to find a positive correlation between the number of political connections within a 
firm and the interest rate at which the firm borrows money. 
 
H2a: The interest rate spread is higher for politically connected lenders than for non-connected 
lenders. 
Unlike what may have been suggested by Sapienza (2012), we expect to find that politically 
connected lenders benefit from their connections by charging higher rates than their non-
connected peers. 
 
H2b: The interest rate spread is higher for type-2-connected lenders than for type-1-connected 
lenders. 
As for H1b, we expect that the less visible a connection is the less effective it is. 
 
H2c: The interest rate spread is higher for lenders with stronger political connections. 
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As for H1c, we expect to find a correlation between the number of links of a lender and the rate 
the lender charges. 
 
H3a: Politically connected borrowers borrow less frequently from connected lenders than from 
non-connected lenders. 
We expect to find that politically connected borrowers try to minimize the visibility of their 
connection by refraining from borrowing money from banks that are also connected. 
 
H3b: Politically connected borrowers borrow more frequently from lenders connected through 
type 2 definition than through type 1 
Similarly, we expect politically connected borrowers to prefer to borrow money from lenders 
with a lowly than with a highly visible connection. 
 
One important question remains: what is the impact of a double connection – with both the lender 
and the borrower connected – on the rate?  Litterature give contrasted results. While Khwajan 
and Mian (2004) do not seem to find an impact, Infante and Piazza (2014) suggest a negative 
impact on the interest rate when banks politically influenced at the local level lend to politically 
connected firm. As the scope of our study and, more importantly, the definitions we use 
significantly differ from theirs, we make no such hypothesis on the impact of a same type double 
connection – meaning two type-1 connected counterparts or to type-2 connected counterparts – 
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but we hypothesize that the expected effect from H1b and H2b would hold, that is that it is 
beneficial to be type-2 rather than type-1 connected for the lender as for the borrower. That is, we 
make the hypothesis that a company derives stronger benefits from being connected with a 
politician with a low media exposure than with a high profile politician. 
 
H4: When both the borrower and the lender are connected, the rate is lower if the borrower is 
type-2-connected than if he is type-1-connected 
This hypothesis is similar to H1b but focuses on the effect of a connection on both sides of the 
loan. As in H1b, we expect to find that a less visible connection confers a greater advantage to 
the borrower than a more visible one. 
 
H5: When both the borrower and the lender are connected, the rate is higher if the lender is type-
2-connected than if he is type-1-connected 
This hypothesis is similar to H2b but focuses on the effect of a connection on both sides of the 
loan. This hypothesis is the lender-equivalent of H4. As in H2b, we expect to find that a less 
visible connection confers a greater advantage to the lender than a more visible one. 
While the “a” hypotheses are intended to test the general effect of political connection for lenders 
and for borrowers, the “b” hypotheses – as well as H4 and H5 – are particularly designed to test 
the difference between the two categories of connections we defined. Finally, the “c” hypotheses 
are designed to test the effect of the number of links, which we assume could capture the strength 
of a connection. 
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3.4. Empirical results 
 
3.4.1. Regression results 
Our results show that firms – whether they be lenders or borrowers – benefit from political 
connection in a more complex way than what has been shown so far.  
The main result is that connected borrowers of type 2 have access to cheaper credit only if the 
lender is connected – whether type 1 or type 2, the effect being stronger for type 2.  This effect 
does not hold for type-1-connected borrowers. 
We also show that politically connected lenders charge significantly higher rates. This effect is 
stronger when the lender has multiple connections of type 2 – there is too little diversity in the 
sample to test this relation for type 1 links.    
Moreover, there is a significant positive impact of the borrower’s profitability on the rate of 
interest. While this result could seem counter-intuitive, there might be several explanations for 
this: borrowers with a higher profitability bear higher risk and therefore are charged more – 
although we do not find the profitability and volatility of profitability to be correlated – or,  
paying a higher rate could positively pressured a borrower into performing better. Finally, lenders 
could take advantage of the more profitable borrowers, as they may have less interest in trying to 
negotiate lower rates. 
These results thus corroborate empirical studies which show that there are benefits for a firm to 
be politically connected. Importantly, they also support the importance of the type of connection 
– which we categorized based on a visibility criteria. 
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In particular, we show that: 
1/ a borrower politically connected through a low profile politician (type 2) has access to cheaper 
credit but only if he borrows from a politically connected lender – with a stronger effect for a 
type-2-connected lender. 
2/ a politically connected lender charges higher rates on average, but lowers rates to a type-2-
connected borrower – there is no significant effect with a borrower of type 1. 
3/ the strength of the lender link has a positive impact on the rate he charges. This is true for link 
of type 2 only, as there is not enough variety in the sample to test this relation for type 1 
connections. There is no significant impact of the strength of the borrower connection on the rate. 
However, the variable we use to proxy for the strength offers some redundancy with the variable 
controlling for the existence of a political connection and a more accurate proxy is probably 
needed to better test the strength effect. 
 
To furthermore demonstrate the importance of discriminating between highly visible and lowly 
visible connection, we also run the regression without taking into account the lowly visible 
connections. That is, we run the regression without the dummies accounting for type 2 
connections – these dummies being iStrength(B2) , iL2 , iB2 , iL1B2 , iL2B1  and iL2B2 . This is 
regression (2) on table 1, and this is the closest to what can be found in the literature, as less 
visible connections are not taken into account. The results are similar to the previous ones but 
with two major differences: type-1-connected borrowers have access to cheaper credit and the 
significance is weaker. These differences are driven by the fact that type-2-connected borrowers 
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pay non-significantly higher rates unless they borrow to a connected lender – type-1 or type-2-
connected, with a stronger impact for type-2 – in which case the rate is lower. 
 
We also run a regression (3) taking only into account the connections of type 2: being type-2-
connected as no effect on the rate unless both the lender and the borrower are, in which case the 
rate is significantly lower. 
Finally, we run the same regression again (4) but without discriminating between highly visible 
and lowly visible connections. In this regression type-1 and type-2 form a unique category that 
we call type 3 (see table 1). In this regression, notice that iStrength(L3)  accounts for the total 
number of links of the lender involved in facility i – that is, the sum of the number of links of 
type 1 and of type 2. The same goes for iStrength(B3) . 
iStrength(L3)  is equal to the total number of links of the lender involved in facility i minus 1, or 
to 0 if this number is equal to 0. 
iStrength(B3)   is equal to the total number of links of the borrower involved in facility i minus 1, 
or to 0 if this number is equal to 0. 
 
Moreover, we also find that the more cash a company holds, the higher the rate. The liquidity 
measure might be a proxy for the quality of governance, as holding cash is usually seen as a sign 
of weak governance. This would explain the negative relation. Boubakri et al. (2013) find that 
politically connected firms hold more cash. We do not find significant results, as politically 
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connected borrowers from our sample exhibit a non significant slightly higher liquidity ratio than 
their non connected pairs. Unsurprisingly, we find that the higher (lower) the amount (maturity) 
of the loan, the lower (higher) the rate. Consistent with LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes (2003), we 
find that the existence of a lending relationship between the lender and the borrower lowers the 
rate of interest, although the relation is most often non-significant. We establish that listed 
borrowers are charged a higher rate than non-connected ones. Again, there is more than one 
plausible explanation. Listed companies having access to bond markets, the fact that listed 
borrowers take bank loans might capture the fact that their debt is perceived as risky – we find 
that listed companies have a slightly higher leverage and a slightly lower volatility of 
profitability, but the these differences are not significant. In line with Ferreira and Matos (2012), 
one might also argue that this relates to a form of looting from lenders involved in a borrower’s 
corporate governance, as lenders can more easily be shareholders of listed borrowers. Finally, the 
size of total assets lower the rate, which might be interpreted as lower risk of default by the 
banker or equivalently as higher collateral. We also find that the results do not hold for revolver 
type loans. 
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Table 1: Determinants of the interest rate spread of bank loans 
Variables are as defined in sections 2.3. and 2.4. ***, ** and * are significantly 
different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
Variable Coefficient (standard error) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 
2,2919*** 
(0,62988) 
2,70952*** 
(0,58449) 
2,55622*** 
(0,62015) 
2,12233*** 
(0,60884) 
(Profitability) 
-3,21426* 
(1,93132) 
-3,36306* 
(1,92141) 
-3,53914* 
(1,89775) 
-3,12647 
(1,90784) 
Profitability 
3,3619*** 
(0,78546) 
3,55662*** 
(0,77471) 
3,35365*** 
(0,769) 
3,07268*** 
(0,77244) 
Leverage 
0,14086 
(0,29609) 
0,08365 
(0,29697) 
0,12892 
(0,29754) 
0,0508 
(0,29449) 
Liquidity 
2,10778*** 
(0,7368) 
2,06281*** 
(0,74005) 
2,05526*** 
(0,73379) 
2,12407*** 
(0,72761) 
Assets 
-0,27913*** 
(0,07579) 
-0,27815*** 
(0,07603) 
-0,29493*** 
(0,07532) 
-0,29499*** 
(0,07463) 
Amount 
0,02788 
(0,08827) 
0,00544 
(0,08711) 
0,03042 
(0,08716) 
0,0604 
(0,08652) 
Maturity 
0,51335*** 
(0,11479) 
0,55774*** 
(0,11514) 
0,53813*** 
(0,11523) 
0,51461*** 
(0,11493) 
Listed 
0,1547** 
(0,07475) 
0,12679* 
(0,07358) 
0,12888* 
(0,0739) 
0,14581** 
(0,07378) 
Related 
-0,10175 
(0,0816) 
-0,13217 
(0,08118) 
-0,12161 
(0,08062) 
-0,09409 
(0,08063) 
Democracy_Index 
-1,00343** 
(0,39019) 
-1,14241*** 
(0,38658) 
-1,10033*** 
(0,38927) 
-1,01966*** 
(0,38368) 
Strength(L2) 
0,42138*** 
(0,15001) 
  
0,47526*** 
(0,14821) 
  
Strength(L3)       
0,29997** 
(0,1193) 
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Strength(B1) 
0,16228 
(0,23083) 
0,20936 
(0,23003) 
    
Strength(B2) 
-0,00821 
(0,03951) 
  
-0,01282 
(0,03643) 
  
Strength(B3)       
-0,01101 
(0,03389) 
L 1 
0,37423*** 
(0,1234) 
0,1548* 
(0,09395) 
    
L2 
0,27834** 
(0,10881) 
  
0,1009 
(0,08688) 
  
L3       
0,31911*** 
(0,09646) 
B 1 
-0,10498 
(0,1647) 
-0,22293* 
(0,11679) 
    
B2 
0,18033 
(0,11281) 
  
0,07197 
(0,0906) 
  
B3       
0,11686 
(0,10629) 
L1*B1 
-0,05865 
(0,25223) 
0,1565 
(0,2148) 
    
L1*B2 
-0,38528* 
(0,20984) 
      
L2*B1 
-0,19229 
(0,22844) 
      
L2*B2 
-0,43348*** 
(0,16579) 
  
-0,25643* 
(0,14792) 
  
L3*B3       
-0,35136** 
(0,1367) 
R² 0,267 0,238 0,247 0,259 
Adjusted R² 0,239 0,219 0,227 0,239 
F-Statistic 9,5587*** 12,4185*** 12,1836*** 12,9322*** 
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3.4.2. Hypotheses validation 
 
H1a: The interest rate spread is lower for politically connected borrowers than for non-
connected borrowers. 
This hypothesis is validated if taking into account definition 1 only – the closest from Faccio’s – 
and considering type-2-connected firms as not politically connected, as the rate is significantly 
lower at the 1% level when the borrower is politically connected. 
However, this hypothesis is only validated in this case, and not if we account for both type of 
connections, whether we discriminate (regression 1) or not (regression 4) between type 1 and 
type 2. Results of regression (3) show no effect when we only take into account connections of 
type 2 and that the borrower is type-2 connected. 
 
H1b: The interest rate spread is lower for type-2-connected borrowers than for type-1-connected 
borrowers connected. 
This hypothesis is not validated. In fact, non significant results from regression (1) suggest that 
type-1-connected borrowers enjoy cheaper rates on average while type-2-connected borrowers 
are charged more. 
However, it is worth noticing that when we ignore definition 2 (regression 2), the type-1-
connected borrowers enjoy significantly lower rates, but that this does not hold if we distinguish 
between type 1 and type 2 (regression 1). 
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This suggests that it is less advantageous for a borrower to be type-1-connected than studies 
which do not integrate the visibility dimension show. 
 
H1c: The interest rate spread is lower for borrowers with stronger political connections. 
 This hypothesis is not validated. The strength of the link of the borrower does not appear to have 
any effect on the interest rate. Excluding the variable capturing the strength of the links from the 
regression give similar results as shown by table 9 (appendix 6). 
Thus, the rate of interest paid by the borrower is independent of the strength of his political 
connection. 
 
H2a: The interest rate spread is higher for politically connected lenders than for non-connected 
lenders. 
This hypothesis is validated as results from regressions (1), (2) and (4) show a significant 
increase in the rate of the loan when the lender is politically connected. This is consistent with the 
literature. Regression (3) shows no significant effect however of a type-2 lender connection, but 
the effect of the strength of the type-2 link remains. As the result table 9 in appendix 6 suggests, 
this might due to the redundancy of the strength variable and the type-2 connection dummy 
variable. 
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H2b: The interest rate spread is higher for type-2-connected lenders than for type-1-connected 
lenders. 
This hypothesis is not validated. On the opposite, regression results show that the spread is higher 
for type-1-connected lenders than for type-2-connected lenders. This result is further discussed in 
section X. 
 
H2c: The interest rate spread is higher for lenders with stronger political connections. 
This hypothesis is validated as results show that the stronger the link of the lender, the higher the 
rate. 
 
H3: When both the borrower and the lender are connected, the rate is lower if the borrower is 
type-2-connected than if he is type-1-connected 
This hypothesis is validated. Regression results show that the rate is significantly lower when the 
lender is connected and the borrower is type-2-connected but show no effect when the lender is 
connected and the borrower is type-1-connected. This effect appears to be stronger when the 
lender is type-2-connected than when he is type-1-connected, providing support to the 
interpretation that highly visible political connections have a lesser impact than less visible 
political connections. 
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H4: When both the borrower and the lender are connected, the rate is higher if the lender is type-
2-connected than if he is type-1-connected 
We do not validate this hypothesis. In fact, regression results show that when both the lender and 
the borrower are politically connected, there is no significant effect when the borrower is type-1-
connected. When the borrower is type-2-connected and the lender is connected, the rate is 
significantly lower, and the effect is stronger when the lender is also of type-2. 
 
We also look at the distribution of the loans between connected borrowers and lenders. We use 
the proportion of connected lenders and borrowers to calculate a random theoretical distribution 
and compare it to the effective distribution. Results show that the effective distribution is 
significantly different from the theoretical one. The number of loans involving a connected 
borrower and a type-1-connected lender is significantly lower than in the random distribution. 
 
Table 2: Variation of effective distribution from 
theoretical distribution (Khi2 value) 
   L1   L2   L3  
 
B1  
-0,04 
(0,06234) 
0,12 
(0,49769) 
0,04 
(0,11939) 
 
B2  
-0,28*** 
(6,69675) 
0,11 
(1,15315) 
-0,07 
(1,09689) 
 
B3  
-0,21** 
(5,64724) 
0,11 
(1,73037) 
-0,04 
(0,53115) 
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H5a: Politically connected borrowers borrow less frequently from connected lenders than from 
non-connected lenders 
This hypothesis is not validated. Table 2 shows that politically connected borrowers tend to 
borrow less from politically connected lenders than if they chose the lender randomly, but this 
variation is not significant. 
 
H5b: Politically connected borrowers borrow more frequently from lenders connected through 
type 2 definition than through type 1 
This hypothesis is validated as results show that the frequency of loans between politically 
connected borrowers and type-1-connected lenders is significantly lower than if borrowers chose 
lenders randomly while the frequency of loans between borrowers and type-2 connected lenders 
is non-significantly higher. This result is even stronger for type-2-connected borrowers, but does 
not hold for type-1-connected borrowers. 
 
While this result should be corroborated with a larger sample, it gives an indication that 
politically connected borrowers tend to avoid to borrow money from lenders with a highly visible 
connection but favor these with a less visible connection. 
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3.5. Extension: The role of elections 
 
On the 1142 facilities from our facility, 290 deals were made during the 6 months prior to an 
election and 201 occurred during the 6 months past an election. While we do not find a 
significant difference between the interest rates of pre and post election periods – neither do they 
differ significantly from the rates of non election periods, studying the distribution of loans 
depending on the political connections of the borrower and the lender yields interesting results. 
 
For each time period, we test the distribution of the deals categorized depending on the politically 
connected statuses of the borrower and the lender with a Pearson’s chi squared test. Table 3 
exhibits the results of this test.  
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Table 3: Variation of effective 
distribution from theoretical 
distribution (Khi2 value) 
   6 months 
prior to 
election  
 6 months 
following an 
election    
 L1  
-0,019 
(0,03916) 
0,327*** 
(8,42779) 
 L2  
-0,265*** 
(9,34196) 
0,06 
(0,33568) 
 B1  
-0,234 
(1,6627) 
0,368* 
(2,83988) 
 B2  
-0,009 
(0,00752) 
-0,04 
(0,1095) 
L1*B1 
-0,741** 
(4,34327) 
1,059** 
(6,15271) 
L1*B2 
-0,42** 
(3,93753) 
0,185 
(0,52821) 
L2*B1 
0,16 
(0,22715) 
0,339 
(0,70683) 
L2*B2 
-0,05 
(0,06212) 
0,309 
(1,66247) 
 
The results show that companies borrow from a politically connected bank significantly more 
after an election than before. While there is no significant difference for type-2-connected 
borrowers, type-1-connected borrowers borrow significantly more after an election. 
Finally, loans between a type-1-connected lender and a connected borrower of type 1 or 2 occur 
significantly more frequently after an election than before. It should however be noted that while 
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the tests show statistical significance for L1*B1 and L1*B2, the small number of observations of 
these types of deals commands some prudence in the interpretation of the results. 
A very interesting result is the difference between the distribution of loans involving type-1 and 
type-2 connected borrowers. While companies with more visible links borrow significantly more 
after than before an election, results show no such variation for companies with less visible 
political ties.  
A possible interpretation for this is linked to the political uncertainty. Since the uncertainty about 
the election outcome is higher before than after the election, politically connected borrowers and 
lenders might be tempted to delay on borrowing money before the outcome of the election is 
known. 
Another possible interpretation, consistent with the idea that politicians try to influence the firms 
they are tied to so as to minimize their exposure, is that an electoral period might be a particularly 
bad time for a politician to be suspected of collusion or to have his business ties exposed. Hence, 
the more visible the political connection of a company (bank) the more reluctant they are to 
borrow (loan) money from (to) a politically connected lender (borrower), particularly if this 
connection has a high visibility. Firms with a highly visible political connection would thus delay 
deal making to a period when the potential cost for politicians of being suspected of collusion is 
lower. 
 
However, other explanations could be advanced and more data is probably needed before any 
conclusive results can be reached. For instance, taking into account the affiliation to a particular 
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political party of the lenders and borrowers as well as the expected outcome of the election – or 
the uncertainty over the outcome – could bring interesting results. Moreover, detailed data on 
electoral outcomes and links could allow us to proxy more accurately for the strength of political 
connections, as Khwaja and Mian (2005) do on a sample of Pakistani firms. This would however 
require defining international categories of political affiliations. 
 
Overall, we show that elections matter, but we would need more accurate political data to 
corroborate studies such as Akey (2013), Ferguson and Voth (2008) or Cooper et al. (2009) on 
the impact of being connected to the election winner (looser). 
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3.6. Discussion 
 
We introduce a new dimension to the definition of political connection. We assume that 
politicians at the highest levels have a larger media exposure and are more careful in trying to 
prevent any possible suspicion of collusion. In particular, this would lead firms connected with 
high profile politician to be less positively impacted by these ties than firms connected with lower 
profile politicians. This would also lead firms tied to a more exposed politician to try to avoid 
doing business with politically connected banks. 
 
We conduct a cross-county study of the impact of these different political connections on the 
interest rate paid on loans by companies and find significant evidence in support of the pertinence 
of this discrimination. We find that politically connected firms obtain significantly lower interest 
rates when they are connected with a lower profile politician and that they borrow money from 
politically connected banks. Firms connected with highly visible politicians do not appear to 
enjoy any similar discount. Our results offer some consistency with Khwaja and Mian (2005) 
who find that politically connected borrowers derive rents on their loans. Since we use different 
definitions and variables, comparing our results has limited meaning. 
 
We share some similarities with Infante and Piazza (2014) who find that politically connected 
companies have access to significantly cheaper credit when borrowing to banks politically 
influenced at a local level in Italy. We find a similar impact but on a larger scope and with 
different definitions. Indeed we do not investigate local connections and only take into account 
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national and top regional politicians. Importantly, we use an innovative definition of political 
connections by introducing a “media exposure” criterion. 
 
Companies which borrow money from politically connected banks pay a significantly higher 
interest rate unless they are themselves politically connected. Sapienza (2012) find that state-
owned banks charge a lower interest rate. Because we use different definitions – politically 
connected instead of state-owned firms – it is somewhat difficult to compare our results with 
hers. However, if one was to assume comparability between state-owned and politically 
connected banks, the difference in our results could be explained by the fact that double-
connection – both the lender and the borrower – matters and that politically connected banks 
favor only politically connected borrowers. 
 
We also try to determine if politically connected borrowers deal more frequently with politically 
connected lenders, and if the distinction we propose between different levels of connection plays 
a role. 
Consistent with the hypothesis that visibility matters, our results indicate that politically 
connected borrowers tend to avoid lenders who have a highly visible political connection and 
suggest that they favor these with a lowly visible connection or no connection at all. We suggest 
that this could come from the fact that politicians want to minimize the chance of their business 
ties becoming a news story, because this would hurt their reputation and be a political cost for 
them – by lowering their poll ratings, or forcing them to resign. To give more consistency to this 
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interpretation we also test the distribution of loans in the six months preceding and in the six 
months following a national election. We find evidence that deals involving a politically 
connected borrower occur with a higher frequency after rather than before the election. This is 
also the case for loans involving a borrower connected through a high profile politician. This 
suggests some consistence with studies such as Bertrand et al. (2007) who show the impact of 
electoral process on the decisions made by politically connected firms but also calls for the use of 
more variables to corroborate the effects of siding with the winning party as shown by Akey 
(2013) amongst others. 
 
While this can be seen as a support of the visibility hypothesis, there are however other possible 
explanations, and these results could also be driven by the uncertainty over the outcome of the 
election as well as by the political affiliations of firms. 
 
Overall, our results are consistent with the literature – such as Khwaja and Mian (2005), 
Charumilind et al. (2006), Johnson and Mitton (2003) or Blau et al. (2013) – suggesting that 
political connections are beneficial. Importantly, we show that connections can be discriminated 
based on their level and what we labeled as visibility or media exposure and that political 
connections might be especially – or only – beneficial for politically connected companies that 1/ 
have a lowly visible connection and 2/ borrow money from politically connected banks. 
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3.7. Conclusion 
 
We introduce a new dimension to the definition of political connection that we call the 
“visibility” of a political connection. We subcategorize politically connected firms into firms 
connected to politicians with a large media exposure and lower level politicians and test the 
impact of these subcategories on the interest rate of bank loans. 
 
We find evidence in support of the accuracy of this exposure based discrimination. While 
companies connected with a top profile politician enjoy lower credit rates on average, the effect 
is much stronger if they are connected with a lower profile politician and the lender is also 
politically connected. 
While politically connected banks charge significantly higher rates on average, the effect does 
not hold when the borrower is also politically connected. Moreover, we find that companies tied 
with less exposed politicians avoid borrowing money from banks connected with high profile 
politicians. There are multiple possible interpretations for this effect. It is possible that these 
companies want to minimize the risk of their political connections making it to the news and thus 
try to keep their ties in the shadows. It is also possible that less exposed politicians being lower 
level politicians, they refrain to negotiate with these banks to avoid putting themselves in a 
situation where political hierarchal links could interfere.  
 
Finally, we study the impact of electoral periods on loans between politically connected agents. 
While we do not find the interest rate to vary significantly before or after an election, loans from 
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politically connected lenders occur significantly more frequently in the 6 months following a 
national-level election than in the 6 months before. We also find that companies tied to a high 
profile politician borrow significantly more frequently after an election than before, but that 
companies connected to a lower profile politician do not. This suggests that connected companies 
and the politicians they are connected to try to minimize the risk of being, wrongly or rightly, 
publicly accused of ethic breach or collusion. 
 
Overall, our results give significant support to the necessity of a more subtle definition of 
political connection as we show that less visible connections have a stronger impact than 
connections with high profile politicians. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Borrowers characteristics 
 
Table 4a: Borrowers characteristics 
Remark: The borrower column gives the category of deals borrowers are involved in. The "L1" line 
thus gives data on borrowers involved in a deal with a type-1-connected lender 
Borrower Facilities Borrower Total Assets Loan Amount Loan Maturity 
  Number %  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
L 1 109 19%        39 448             7 355              1 082                400    48 60 
L2 226 40%        50 180           10 839                 860                425    51 60 
B 1 86 15%        16 205             9 481              1 234             1 000    42 60 
B2 77 13%        87 951           18 414              1 454                750    43 57 
L1*B1 23 4%        15 360             9 481              1 615             1 200    40 60 
L1*B2 27 5%      143 526           37 133              1 847                732    43 60 
L2*B1 30 5%        20 192           14 032              1 291             1 000    41 57 
L2*B2 63 11%      123 839           24 307              1 284                750    48 60 
All 572 100%        41 658             9 534              1 107                575    51 60 
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Table 4b: Borrowers characteristics 
Remark: The borrower column gives the category of deals borrowers are involved in. The "L1" 
line thus gives data on borrowers involved in a deal with a type-1-connected lender 
Borrower 
  
Spread (Profitability) Profitability Leverage Liquidity 
% of 
Listed 
L 1 
Mean 1,2509 1,81% -0,27% -1,94% -1,71% 25,55% 
Median 0,7500 1,28% -0,18% -1,66% -1,74% 0,00% 
L2 
Mean 1,1251 2,45% 0,94% -3,00% -0,60% 24,23% 
Median 0,6000 1,63% -0,21% -2,61% -1,25% 0,00% 
B 1 
Mean 0,5399 1,94% 1,19% -1,21% -1,80% 56,48% 
Median 0,2000 1,73% -0,67% -0,27% -1,56% 100,00% 
B2 
Mean 0,8177 1,97% -0,08% -3,66% -1,25% 27,59% 
Median 0,3750 1,36% -0,06% -6,93% -1,68% 0,00% 
L1*B1 
Mean 0,7521 2,48% -0,84% -0,56% -2,70% 65,52% 
Median 0,7250 2,32% -1,26% 0,92% -2,67% 100,00% 
L1*B2 
Mean 1,0911 1,25% -0,50% -4,05% -0,55% 15,25% 
Median 0,5000 0,95% -0,06% -8,90% -1,42% 0,00% 
L2*B1 
Mean 1,0911 1,25% -0,50% -4,05% -0,55% 15,25% 
Median 0,5000 0,95% -0,06% -8,90% -1,42% 0,00% 
L2*B2 
Mean 0,8279 2,04% -0,54% -2,99% -0,78% 31,68% 
Median 0,4125 1,40% -0,32% -0,21% -1,12% 0,00% 
All 
Mean 1,0043 2,24% 0,24% -2,39% -1,28% 26,01% 
Median 0,5000 1,57% -0,18% -1,86% -1,55% 0,00% 
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Appendix 2: Links per connected borrowers and lenders 
Table 5: Average number of links 
per connection category 
Company Number of links 
  Mean Median 
L 1 1 1 
L2 1,1687657 1 
B 1 1,212963 1 
B2 1,6966292 1 
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Appendix 3: Deals distribution per year 
Table 6: Deals distribution per 
year 
Year 
Number of deals over 
total number of deals 
1987 0% 
1988 0% 
1996 1% 
1997 3% 
1998 2% 
1999 3% 
2000 4% 
2001 7% 
2002 7% 
1994 1% 
1995 0% 
2003 13% 
2004 7% 
2005 9% 
2006 5% 
2007 6% 
2008 10% 
2009 12% 
2010 7% 
2011 4% 
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Appendix 4: Geographical distribution 
Table 7: Political connected firms distribution per country 
Country  Lenders  Borrowers 
  
Total L1 
% of L1 
lenders 
L2 
% of L2 
lenders 
Total B1 
% of B1 
Borrowers 
B2 
% of B2 
borrowers   
United Arab 
Emirates 
1 0 0% 1 100% 0 0   0   
Austria 2 0 0% 2 100% 1 0 0% 0 0% 
Australia 1 0 0% 0 0% 4 0 0% 1 25% 
Belgium 1 0 0% 0 0% 3 2 67% 0 0% 
Canada 0 0   0   1 0 0% 1 100% 
Switzerland 2 0 0% 0 0% 1 0 0% 0 0% 
China 2 1 50% 1 50% 0 0   0   
Germany 0 0   0   9 0 0% 2 22% 
Denmark 1 0 0% 1 100% 0 0   0   
Spain 2 1 50% 0 0% 2 0 0% 0 0% 
Finland 1 0 0% 0 0% 2 0 0% 0 0% 
France 2 0 0% 2 100% 12 0 0% 7 58% 
United Kingdom 1 1 100% 0 0% 7 1 14% 1 14% 
Hong Kong 3 0 0% 2 67% 2 0 0% 1 50% 
Indonesia 0 0   0   1 0 0% 1 100% 
Ireland 0 0   0   4 1 25% 2 50% 
Israel 2 0 0% 2 100% 1 0 0% 1 100% 
India 1 1 100% 0 0% 3 0 0% 1 33% 
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Italy 1 0 0% 0 0% 3 0 0% 0 0% 
Japan 6 1 17% 2 33% 72 0 0% 2 3% 
South Korea 2 0 0% 1 50% 5 0 0% 0 0% 
Cayman Islands 0 0   0   1 0 0% 1 100% 
Luxemburg 0 0   0   1 0 0% 0 0% 
Mexico 0 0   0   1 0 0% 0 0% 
Malaysia 1 0 0% 0 0% 1 0 0% 1 100% 
Netherlands 0 0   0   3 0 0% 1 33% 
Norway 0 0   0   1 0 0% 0 0% 
Philippines 1 1 100% 0 0% 1 1 100% 0 0% 
Portugal 1 0 0% 0 0% 0 0   0   
Russia 0 0   0   1 0 0% 0 0% 
Saudi Arabia 3 0 0% 2 67% 1 0 0% 0 0% 
Sweden 0 0   0   2 0 0% 0 0% 
Singapore 1 0 0% 1 100% 1 1 100% 1 100% 
Taiwan 11 0 0% 2 18% 7 1 14% 1 14% 
United States of 
America 
2 0 0% 0 0% 100 18 18% 44 44% 
South Africa 0 0   0   2 0 0% 1 50% 
All 51 6 12% 19 37% 256 25 10% 70 27% 
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Appendix 5: Politically connected firms characteristics regression 
results 
 
Table 8: Impact of political connection on firm characteristics 
Variables are as defined in sections 2.3. and 2.4. ***, ** and * are 
significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
Variable Coefficient (standard error) 
 
Profitability Leverage Liquidity 
Intercept 
0,07276*** 
(0,02564) 
-0,22726*** 
(0,06209) 
-0,00027 
(0,02672) 
(Profitability) 
0,3221*** 
(0,07805) 
-0,45785** 
(0,19096) 
0,11016 
(0,0817) 
Profitability   
0,01408 
(0,08527) 
0,00863 
(0,03639) 
Leverage 
0,00238 
(0,01444) 
  
-0,11266*** 
(0,01445) 
Liquidity 
0,00802 
(0,03384) 
-0,61844*** 
(0,0793) 
  
Assets 
-0,02014*** 
(0,0031) 
0,01158 
(0,00771) 
-0,00104 
(0,0033) 
Amount 
0,01835*** 
(0,00349) 
-0,00416 
(0,00863) 
0,00413 
(0,00368) 
Maturity 0 (0,00495) 
0,00914 
(0,01202) 
0,01904*** 
(0,00509) 
Listed 
0,01266*** 
(0,00361) 
0,00847 
(0,00884) 
-0,00073 
(0,00377) 
Related 
-0,00753** 
(0,00342) 
0,01643** 
(0,00833) 
0,0111*** 
(0,00354) 
Democracy_Index 
-0,11128*** 
(0,01877) 
0,16956*** 
(0,0462) 
-0,08704*** 
(0,01965) 
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B 1 
0,00396 
(0,00511) 
-0,00784 
(0,01242) 
-0,00557 
(0,0053) 
B2 
-0,00353 
(0,00392) 
-0,03092*** 
(0,00946) 
-0,00462 
(0,00406) 
R² 0,153 0,141 0,148 
Adjusted R² 0,141 0,130 0,136 
F-Statistic 13,3176*** 12,1446*** 12,8056*** 
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Appendix 6: Interest rate spread regression results 
 
Table 9: Determinants of the interest rate spread of bank loans without the 
strength variable 
Variables are as defined in sections 2.3. and 2.4. ***, ** and * are significantly 
different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
Variable Coefficient (standard error) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 
1,94272*** 
(0,6199 ) 
2,71291*** 
(0,58439 ) 
2,20562*** 
(0,61507 ) 
1,87559*** 
(0,60301 ) 
(Profitability) 
-3,07093 
(1,92829 ) 
-3,5017 
(1,91507 ) 
-3,18303 
(1,90406 ) 
-2,75092 
(1,90718 ) 
Profitability 
3,10216*** 
(0,78364 ) 
3,5121*** 
(0,77305 ) 
3,12044*** 
(0,77028 ) 
2,85264*** 
(0,77025 ) 
Leverage 
0,07869 
(0,29652 ) 
0,08462 
(0,29692 ) 
0,06093 
(0,29879 ) 
0,05729 
(0,29519 ) 
Liquidity 
2,31028*** 
(0,73105 ) 
2,15866*** 
(0,7324 ) 
2,20559*** 
(0,73563 ) 
2,2302*** 
(0,72779 ) 
Assets 
-0,28547*** 
(0,07562 ) 
-0,28598*** 
(0,07553 ) 
-0,29632*** 
(0,07574 ) 
-0,30335*** 
(0,07476 ) 
Amount 
0,06203 
(0,08788 ) 
0,01336 
(0,08666 ) 
0,05815 
(0,08735 ) 
0,08639 
(0,08623 ) 
Maturity 
0,54768*** 
(0,11439 ) 
0,5654*** 
(0,11481 ) 
0,57347*** 
(0,11489 ) 
0,54617*** 
(0,11418 ) 
Listed 
0,144** 
(0,07278 ) 
0,11645 
(0,07268 ) 
0,12089* 
(0,07162 ) 
0,14274** 
(0,07131 ) 
Related 
-0,10688 
(0,08133 ) 
-0,12507 
(0,08079 ) 
-0,14048* 
(0,08069 ) 
-0,11098 
(0,08041 ) 
Democracy_Index 
-0,96291** 
(0,3895 ) 
-1,17109*** 
(0,38524 ) 
-1,03626*** 
(0,3907 ) 
-0,99875*** 
(0,38449 ) 
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L 1 
0,37501*** 
(0,12405 ) 
0,15416 
(0,09393 ) 
    
L2 
0,35756*** 
(0,10524 ) 
  
0,16981** 
(0,08481 ) 
  
L3       
0,36957*** 
(0,09467 ) 
B 1 
-0,07256 
(0,1573 ) 
-0,1837* 
(0,10853 ) 
    
B2 
0,17744 
(0,11095 ) 
  
0,06154 
(0,09049 ) 
  
B3       
0,11319 
(0,10276 ) 
L1*B1 
-0,03856 
(0,24982 ) 
0,15902 
(0,21475 ) 
    
L1*B2 
-0,39716* 
(0,21088 ) 
      
L2*B1 
-0,26819 
(0,22684 ) 
      
L2*B2 
-0,46193*** 
(0,16623 ) 
  
-0,26439* 
(0,149 ) 
  
L3*B3       
-0,372*** 
(0,13694 ) 
R² 0,256 0,237 0,233 0,250 
Adjusted R² 0,231 0,219 0,215 0,233 
F-Statistic 10,5451*** 13,3115*** 13,0640*** 14,3222*** 
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Appendix 7: Impact of pre- and post-electoral periods on the 
interest rate spread regression results 
 
Table 10: Impact of elections on interest rate spread 
Variables are as defined in sections 2.3. and 2.4. -6fullm (6fullm) is 
a dummy worth 1 is the facility start date was in the 6 months 
preceding (following) a national-level election, and 0 otherwise. 
***, ** and * are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level 
Variable Coefficient (standard error)   
 
(1) (2)   
Intercept 
2,28742*** 
(0,63208) 
2,60619*** 
(0,58609) 
  
s(Profitability) 
-3,33821* 
(1,92538) 
-3,39965* 
(1,90268) 
  
Profitability 
3,29857*** 
(0,78746) 
3,31162*** 
(0,76998) 
  
Leverage 
0,12654 
(0,29789) 
0,08136 
(0,29974) 
  
Liquidity 
2,2208*** 
(0,74264) 
2,13169*** 
(0,74587) 
  
Assets 
-0,29147*** 
(0,07625) 
-0,29822*** 
(0,07635) 
  
Amount 
0,04008 
(0,08895) 
0,03457 
(0,08716) 
  
Maturity 
0,51868*** 
(0,11475) 
0,57947*** 
(0,11505) 
  
Listed 
0,15253** 
(0,07533) 
0,10115 
(0,07204) 
  
Related 
-0,09436 
(0,08169) 
-0,13883* 
(0,08103) 
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Democracy_Index 
-1,02346*** 
(0,38889) 
-1,17874*** 
(0,38604) 
  
Strength(L2) 
0,43337*** 
(0,14969) 
    
Strength(B2) 
-0,00978 
(0,0398) 
    
L 1 
0,3854*** 
(0,12487) 
    
L2 
0,28205** 
(0,10941) 
    
B 1 
-0,07366 
(0,15906) 
    
B2 
0,18185 
(0,11289) 
    
L1*B1 
-0,05771 
(0,25258) 
    
L1*B2 
-0,38944* 
(0,21003) 
    
L2*B1 
-0,19566 
(0,22923) 
    
L2*B2 
-0,43992*** 
(0,16646) 
    
-6fullm 
0,00561 
(0,08203) 
-0,00117 
(0,08152) 
  
6fullm 
-0,05341 
(0,08711) 
0,01898 
(0,08676) 
  
R² 0,267275055 0,226806693   
Adjusted R² 0,237912671 0,210208625   
F-Statistic 9,10263*** 13,66464***   
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General conclusion 
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As have been underlined throughout this thesis and mainly in its first chapter, major corporate 
scandals have led to an increase in shareholder activism – with the “apply or comply” rule – and 
to strengthened rules and regulations – with laws such as the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US. 
This, in turn, caused, or speeded up, an evolution in the composition of boards of directors. In 
particular, boards have become more independent from the CEO as well as more gender 
diversified. Empirical findings suggest such boards are more efficient, in a particular in their 
monitoring of the management, and that they are more likely to replace incompetent or 
misbehaving executives. In the first chapter, we also draw a succinct description of the history of 
employee representation, to show how this specific type of directorship has been developed for 
political rather than economical reasons. Interestingly, firm performance concerns have recently 
emerged as an argument in the debate over employee representation. 
 
In chapter 2, we design a simple model of employee representation on the board of directors from 
which we derive some interesting stylized facts. In particular, we show that if employees have 
access to valuable private information, a shareholder value maximizing board may decide to 
prefer long- to short-term investments when there is a limited employee representation without 
which it would not have. Moreover, we show that this may increase shareholder value that 
employee representation may therefore be in the shareholders best interest. While employee 
representation is always beneficial for employees, it is, in some cases, beneficial also to 
shareholders and management alike. Overall, our model provides a theoretical explanation for 
value enhancing role of employee representation that empirical studies suggest. It also gives 
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support to a limited level of employee representation on the boards of directors in sectors where 
inside information is more valuable. 
 
In chapter 3, we introduce a subtle distinction in the usual definition of political connection that 
could have a large impact on empirical studies. Our results suggest that it indeed plays a role.  
 
While there already exists a vast literature related to political connection implications, and that 
some empirical studies share similarities with ours, we provide an original, new perspective for 
investigating politically connected firms. The new definition we give emphasized the risk that 
politicians bear when closely tied to corporations. Because high profile politicians are under 
tougher scrutiny, there are more likely to see their business ties exposed if they appeared to 
constitute a breach of ethics. We assume that in order to prevent an unwanted and damaging 
media coverage they have a lesser involvement than politicians that occupy less visible positions 
and are thus less efficient 
 
We find that politically connected companies pay significantly lower interest loan rates under two 
conditions: 1/ that a company be politically connected through a politician with low media 
exposure and 2/ that the lending bank be politically connected. We find the effect to be even 
stronger if the bank also is connected to a politician with limited visibility. Our results 
furthermore show that politically connected companies borrow much less frequently from banks 
 171  
 
tied with a top profile politician, particularly during the political campaign that precedes a 
national election. 
 
Thus, our results give support to the theory that politically connected companies tend to limit 
their involvement with politically connected banks, as it minimize the risk of the relation being 
publicly exposed and the politician(s) they are tied with to be – rightly or wrongly – suspected of 
ethic breach – or worse.  
 
While we found interesting results that highlight the importance of what we label as “shadow” 
connections, we have yet to enlarge the scope of this study. In particular, we only partially cover 
the role of elections and intend to dig deeper into it. This will require a more precise, and 
probably larger, set of data, so as to include most notably the political affiliations of companies, 
the outcomes and expected outcomes of elections, as it remains to be seen if companies find it 
more beneficial to borrow from banks with a shared political “allegiance”. As a number of the 
loans in our sample are international loans – between a borrower and a lender from different 
countries – this will require to build a categorization process of political affiliation, or/and to 
increase the sample size so as to have a large enough number of domestic deals per countries. 
The results from such a further study should be helpful in confirming, or invalidating, the 
definition we propose. They could also allow us lead us to a better knowledge of the extent of the 
effect we identify, as well as to consider laying a new bridge between finance, law and political 
sciences. 
